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Abstract
Reward magnitude is a central concept in most theories of preferential decision making
and learning. However, it is unknown whether variable rewards also influence cognitive
processes when learning how to make accurate decisions (e.g., sorting healthy and
unhealthy food di ering in appeal). To test this, we conducted three studies.
Participants learned to classify objects with three feature dimensions into two categories
before solving a transfer task with novel objects. During learning, we rewarded correct
decisions, but specific category exemplars yielded a 10 times higher reward (high vs.
low). Counterintuitively, categorization performance did not increase for high-reward
stimuli, compared to an equal-reward baseline condition. Instead, performance
decreased reliably for low-reward stimuli. To analyze the influence of reward magnitude
on category generalization, we implemented an exemplar-categorization model and a
cue-weighting model using a Bayesian modeling approach. We tested whether reward
magnitude a ects (a) the availability of exemplars in memory, (b) their psychological
similarity to the stimulus, or (c) attention to stimulus features. In all studies, the
evidence favored the hypothesis that reward magnitude a ects the similarity gradients
of high-reward exemplars compared to the equal-reward baseline. The results from
additional reward-judgment tasks (Studies 2 and 3) strongly suggest that the cognitive
processes of reward-value generalization parallel those of category generalization.
Overall, the studies provide insights highlighting the need for integrating reward- and
category-learning theories.
Keywords: Category Learning, Reward Learning, Generalization, Similarity,
Memory, Decision Making
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The Influence of Reward Magnitude on Stimulus Memory and Stimulus Generalization
in Categorization Decisions
Since Thorndike (1911) formulated the law of e ect, decades of reinforcement
learning research (see Mackintosh, 1974; Sutton & Barto, 1998) have a rmed that
knowing the reward values of objects or situations is vital for optimizing
decision-making success (e.g., Kahnt, 2018; Tobler, Fiorillo, & Schultz, 2005), with
success usually defined as obtaining the largest rewards (e.g., by predicting reward
values; see also Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr, & Poldrack, 2009; Kahnt, 2018; Schultz, 2006;
Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; for related overviews). However, while the motivating or
reinforcing role of reward in “successful” decisions has been widely studied (see D. Lee,
Seo, & Jung, 2012; Levine & Edelstein, 2009; O’Doherty, Cockburn, & Pauli, 2017;
Schultz, 2006), how reward magnitude relates to the accuracy of decision making has
been much less studied (see Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998; Seger & Peterson,
2013).
In many professional domains, as well as in everyday life, reward often depends on
decision accuracy. For instance, physicians di erentiate between types of cancer to
accurately assign treatments, and animal caretakers di erentiate between types of food
for di erent animals. In these decisions, receiving a reward for the decision (i.e.,
recovering patients or healthy animals) usually serves as feedback about decision
accuracy, which allows learning about how stimuli relate to categories (e.g., the food
digestible by one animal species but not by another). However, so far, it has been
neglected that reward magnitudes may vary between specific category instances
independent of how stimulus categories are objectively defined (e.g., more or less
enjoyable food). In light of studies showing how easily variable rewards distract from
solving cognitive tasks (e.g., B. A. Anderson, 2013; Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009), the
question arises whether reward magnitude also influences category learning and thereby
decision accuracy.
The goal of the current research was to investigate whether and how
stimulus-specific reward magnitude a ects performance in category learning (e.g.,
learning speed and accuracy) and category generalization (i.e., category inference for
novel stimuli) as well as to identify the involved cognitive mechanisms. These research
questions, however, concern not only category learning but also several decision
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domains, since various aspects of categorization decisions are shared by perceptual,
social, and economic decisions, such as the memorization and identification of objects,
probability learning, inferential choice, and multi-attribute integration (e.g., Achtziger,
Alós-Ferrer, Hügelschäfer, & Steinhauser, 2015; Goldstein, 1991; Juslin, Jones, Olsson,
& Winman, 2003; Markman & Ross, 2003; Miendlarzewska, Bavelier, & Schwartz, 2016;
Pachur & Olsson, 2012; Russell et al., 1999; Seger, Braunlich, Wehe, & Liu, 2015; Seger
& Peterson, 2013; E. R. Smith & Zarate, 1992).
Typical category-learning research implements reward in terms of corrective
feedback (i.e., present = correct vs. absent = incorrect, also referred to as supervised
learning; e.g., Sutton & Barto, 1998). In the following three sections, we outline three
ways that variations in reward value could influence category learning beyond feedback
(for further discussions, see Seger & Peterson, 2013; Tricomi & Fiez, 2008). We explain
the resulting predictions concerning changes in categorization accuracy from three
theoretical perspectives. We first view category inference from an exemplar memory
perspective (e.g., Medin & Scha er, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) with an emphasis on
stimulus recall, then turn to the similarity-based generalization of stimulus categories
and reward values (e.g., Kahnt, Park, Burke, & Tobler, 2012; Shepard, 1987; Wimmer,
Daw, & Shohamy, 2012), and finally define how reward value might alter attention paid
to stimulus dimensions, including consideration of rule-based categorization strategies
(e.g., B. A. Anderson, 2013; Juslin, Jones, et al., 2003; Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley,
George, & Wills, 2016; Reed, 1972).
Reward and Exemplar Memory Strength
One way to learn stimulus categories (or their reward) is to store single instances in
memory, as assumed in the popular generalized context model (GCM; Medin & Scha er,
1978; Nosofsky, 1986, 1988b; see Modeling section for details). According to the GCM,
a decision maker recalls previously encountered exemplars and compares them to the
current stimulus. The stimulus is categorized according to its similarity to the recalled
exemplars. Within this process, reward magnitude could influence which or how easily
exemplars are recalled. In this vein, recent studies from the domain of working memory
have shown that reward anticipation is positively related to recall accuracy (among
other behavioral measures; see also Miendlarzewska et al., 2016). For instance, Wolosin,
Zeithamova, and Preston (2012) found that after seeing pictures of either high- or
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low-reward value, participants’ better recalled the high-reward pictures (see also Aberg,
Müller, & Schwartz, 2017). It seems reasonable to assume a similar e ect in category
learning, as working memory capacity has been shown to predict category-learning
performance (Craig & Lewandowsky, 2012; Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky, Yang,
Newell, & Kalish, 2012), and working memory and category learning rely on shared
cognitive processes (see also Oberauer, 2009; Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007).
One explanation for these results is the memory-strength hypothesis, which builds
on the assumption that increasing reward enhances the availability of the associated
exemplars in memory (e.g., described by the memory-strength parameter in the GCM;
Nosofsky, 2011). This hypothesis is similar to the idea that presenting a stimulus more
frequently during learning increases the memory strength of the stimulus during a
subsequent categorization task (e.g., Nosofsky, 1988b, 1991b). This formal concept has
also been applied to describe the likelihood of stimulus recall in working memory tasks
(e.g., Nosofsky, Little, Donkin, & Fific, 2011). Hence, the memory-strength hypothesis
(implemented in the GCM) predicts an increase in categorization accuracy for
high-reward items, compared to an equal-reward baseline condition. However, it also
predicts a proportional decrease in accuracy for low-reward stimuli, as the GCM
formally treats memory strength as a trade-o  parameter (increasing memory strength
for some exemplars simultaneously decreases memory strength for other exemplars; see
Modeling section for details).
The memory-strength hypothesis is formally equivalent to assuming that
low-reward items are remembered but strategically ignored during the decision process,
which might be a plausible strategy. This view includes the possibility that high-reward
exemplars become the sole representatives of their categories. In this extreme case, the
GCM would become formally identical to a prototype model (e.g., Medin & Smith,
1981; Reed, 1972; J. D. Smith & Minda, 1998). However, while traditionally a
prototype represents the most typical stimulus of a category, in this case the prototype
would represent the most rewarded one. Thus, the predictions of the memory-strength
hypothesis cover three di erent yet related theoretical ideas of the e ect of variable
rewards in category learning: (a) enhanced stimulus memory, (b) strategic information
integration, and (c) reward prototypes.
Despite the common intuition about the enhancing e ects of reward motivation, a
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closer look at recent working memory studies (e.g., Allen & Ueno, 2018; Klink,
Jeurissen, Theeuwes, Denys, & Roelfsema, 2017; Wallis, Stokes, Arnold, & Nobre, 2015)
reveals that di erences in performance between high- and low-reward stimuli possibly
stem from worse performance for low-reward stimuli instead of better performance for
high-reward stimuli. For instance, Klink et al. (2017) compared conditions in which
item reward values were disclosed either during item encoding or during retrieval. Their
data show that low-reward stimuli were recalled worse in the encoding condition
compared to the retrieval condition, while performance for high-reward stimuli did not
di er between conditions. This pattern of results indicates that reward magnitude could
a ect categorization performance through other cognitive processes than memory
strength, which we describe below.
Reward and Stimulus Generalization
In decision making, the term generalization describes the ability to (nonrandomly)
react to novel stimuli after observing the consequences for other stimuli. For instance,
in a typical reward-learning task, the probability of responding (or expecting a reward)
when seeing an unknown stimulus is a function of its similarity to known stimuli. One
widely acknowledged theory describing this function is Shepard’s (1987) law of stimulus
generalization (see also Jäkel, Schölkopf, & Wichmann, 2008a; Mackintosh, 1974;
Miendlarzewska et al., 2016; Seger & Peterson, 2013; Wimmer et al., 2012; Wimmer &
Shohamy, 2012). It assumes that generalization declines exponentially with
psychological similarity between the current stimulus and the previously trained
“reward” stimulus. The speed of the decline is governed by a free parameter, the
similarity gradient.
Shepard’s (1987) stimulus generalization is an important part of both successful
models of working memory predicting recall errors via similarity-based interference
(e.g., Jonides et al., 2008; Oberauer & Lin, 2017) and context models of categorization.
In the latter, the presented stimulus is categorized based on its similarity to previously
encountered instances (Medin & Scha er, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986), or category prototypes
(Medin & Smith, 1981; J. D. Smith & Minda, 1998). Here the similarity gradient
indicates the weight assigned to di erences between a stimulus and exemplars in
memory, such that category inference with narrow gradients includes mainly highly
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similar exemplars (stronger discrimination), while broad gradients also include more
distant exemplars (stronger integration).
Shepard (1987) suggested that “di erential reinforcement could shape the
generalization function and contours around a particular stimulus” (Shepard, 1987, p.
237; see also Mackintosh, 1974). This statement implies that the similarity gradients of
specific instances could depend on their reward value. Indeed, the results of a recent
reward-learning study by Kahnt et al. (2012) showed that reward-dependent
generalization can be described by assuming narrower similarity gradients for
high-reward cues than for low-reward cues (see Miendlarzewska et al., 2016, for further
discussions; see also Wimmer & Shohamy, 2012). In other words, the generalization of
high reward value was “narrower” for trained high-reward cues (stronger
discrimination).
It seems likely that reward magnitude influences the similarity gradients of
category instances, as category feedback processing largely overlaps with reward (value)
processing on the neural level (Aron et al., 2004; Daniel & Pollmann, 2010;
Miendlarzewska et al., 2016; Seger et al., 2015; Seger & Peterson, 2013; Seger &
Spiering, 2011; Shohamy, Myers, Kalanithi, & Gluck, 2008). However, a formal transfer
from reward learning to models of categorization leads to implausible predictions.
Specifically, assuming a GCM with narrower similarity gradients for high-reward
exemplars than for low-reward exemplars, as suggested by the data of Kahnt et al.
(2012), would predict improved learning of low-reward items, which seems unlikely.
One reason for this apparent contradiction could be that the e ect of specific
manipulations on similarity gradients depends on the task structure. For instance,
Hendrickson, Perfors, Navarro, and Ransom (2019) found that when participants
learned to categorize stimuli into “Category A or not” (similar to learning “reward or
not”), increasing the sample size (from 4 to 12) led to behavior compatible with the
idea of narrower similarity gradients (stronger discrimination). In contrast, when
participants learned about two categories (“Category A vs. B”), increasing the sample
size for Category A induced a category bias, which is consistent with the assumption of
broader similarity gradients for Category A exemplars (see also Goldstone & Son, 2005;
Homa, Blair, McClure, Medema, & Stone, 2018; Polk, Behensky, Gonzalez, & Smith,
2002).
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Moreover, in a study on reward and category preferences, Maddox and Bohil
(2001) reported a very similar category bias when one of two categories was associated
with a higher reward (see also Figure 2 in Healy & Kubovy, 1981), as Hendrickson et al.
(2019) reported for stimulus frequency with two exclusive categories. This suggests that
in a categorization task with two exclusive categories, the e ect of reward on similarity
gradients might also be in the opposite direction, as in the “one category”
reward-learning task by (Kahnt et al., 2012); that is, the similarity gradients of
high-reward items may become broader instead of narrower. This hypothesis is
generally compatible with recent theories about how reward value could a ect category
generalization (Miendlarzewska et al., 2016; Seger & Peterson, 2013) and the idea that
reward magnitude modulates how informative an instance of feedback is perceived to
be, as also discussed by Della Libera and Chelazzi (2006) for the case of perceptual
decision making.
In our studies, we focused on category structures with few high-reward stimuli,
because this allowed us to distinguish between the predictions of the outlined similarity
and memory-strength hypotheses. In these tasks, the similarity hypothesis predicts a
decrease in performance for low-reward exemplars but unchanged performance for
high-reward exemplars, compared to baseline (see Modeling section for details). In
contrast, the memory-strength hypothesis predicts an increase in accuracy for high- and
a decrease for low-reward exemplars. However, under di erent category structures, the
behavioral implication of the formal assumptions might change (see also the section
Boundary Conditions, Rules, and Exceptions in the General Discussion). Last, besides
similarity or stimulus recall, reward magnitude could also a ect which stimulus
dimensions a decision maker attends to (i.e., dimension attention) while making
categorizations (e.g., evaluating similarity for color, but not for size; see Le Pelley et al.,
2016; Nosofsky, 1988b).
Reward, Feature Attention, and Rule-Based Strategies
One fundamental assumption of reward and reinforcement learning theories is that
dimension attention (also referred to as feature or cue attention) corresponds to how
well a dimension predicts rewards or decision outcomes (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Indeed,
in standard category-learning tasks, participants shift attention to those stimulus
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features that reliably predict category membership (e.g., Blair, Watson, & Meier, 2009;
Chen, Meier, Blair, Watson, & Wood, 2013; Matsuka & Corter, 2008; Rehder &
Ho man, 2005a, 2005b). According to a recent review by Le Pelley et al. (2016),
however, dimension attention also depends on the value of the predicted outcome.
Thus, when introducing variable rewards in category learning, competing task goals of
predicting category membership or reward magnitude could a ect which stimulus
dimensions are attended to.
If high-reward stimuli automatically draw more attention than low-reward stimuli
(e.g., B. A. Anderson, 2013) and people pay more attention to dimensions that are
predictive of category membership, it seems likely that attention would focus on the
dimensions that predict the category memberships of high-reward exemplars. However,
the dimensions that best predict the category membership of the high-reward stimuli
might not adequately predict the categories of all exemplars. Thus, the attention
hypothesis implies, similar to the memory-strength hypothesis, that categorization
accuracy increases for high-reward stimuli at the cost of accuracy for other exemplars.
In contrast to the similarity and memory-strength hypotheses that apply only to
approaches that concern stimulus-specific e ects, the attention hypothesis also applies
to an important alternative approach to categorizations, namely, rule-based or
cue-abstraction models (CAMs; see Ashby & Gott, 1988; Barsalou, 1990; Goldstein,
1991; Medin & Scha er, 1978; Medin & Smith, 1981; Reed, 1972; for related studies).
We use the term cue abstraction (e.g., Juslin, Jones, et al., 2003; Juslin, Olsson, &
Olsson, 2003) to refer to a class of models that assume people learn how object
dimensions are related to the criterion of interest (e.g., longer objects are more likely in
Category A). This includes very simple rule strategies (e.g., Ashby & Gott, 1988), in
which the values of only one or two dimensions are used to infer categories (e.g., long =
Category A, short = Category B). Such simple rules, however, can be seen as special
cases of so-called linear attribute-weighting models (see also Bröder, Newell, & Platzer,
2010; Juslin, Jones, et al., 2003), which are often used to describe attitude formation in
clinical, social, and quantitative judgments (see N. Anderson, 1981; Brehmer, 1976;
Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Ho mann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2014). These models
assign a weight to each object dimension that reflects the models’ assumptions regarding
the strength of the dimension–criterion relation—and thus the relative importance of
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these dimensions. To predict a category, the weighted values of the dimensions are then
added (i.e., without assuming interactions) and compared to a decision criterion
(Ho mann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2016; Juslin, Jones, et al., 2003).
The predictions of the attention hypothesis from the cue-abstraction perspective
are analogous to those from the context model perspective, despite making di erent
assumptions about how stimulus–response contingencies are represented. If people pay
more attention to high-reward stimuli than low-reward stimuli (e.g., B. A. Anderson,
2013) they might give more weight to changes on dimensions that predict correct
classifications of high-reward stimuli. This, in turn, should lead to an increase in
categorization accuracy for high-reward items, compared to baseline. Moreover, if the
ignored dimensions help predict the categories of low-reward stimuli, then
categorization accuracy should decrease for low-reward stimuli.
Although memory- and rule-based approaches have often been contrasted, a
growing number of researchers acknowledge that both might be part of a more general
cognitive framework, as exemplified in hybrid and mixture models (e.g., Bröder, Gräf, &
Kieslich, 2017; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Johansen & Palmeri, 2002; Medin, Altom, &
Murphy, 1984; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994; Vanpaemel & Storms, 2008). In
addition, a number of di erent representational or mechanistic approaches, such as
category clustering (e.g., Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004), decision trees (e.g., Lafond,
Lacouture, & Cohen, 2009), and Bayesian hypothesis testing (e.g., Sanborn, Gri ths, &
Navarro, 2010; Shi, Gri ths, Feldman, & Sanborn, 2010), have been proposed. In the
current research, we focused on the context model (GCM; Nosofsky, 2011) and
cue-abstraction approaches (e.g., Bröder et al., 2010; Ho mann et al., 2016; Juslin,
Jones, et al., 2003) to describe the consequences of stimulus-specific reward magnitude
for category inference. Specifically, in the GCM we examined whether e ects of variable
rewards are captured by changes in memory strengths or similarity gradients (GCM;
Nosofsky, 2011) and contrasted this exemplar account against a CAM (see Modeling
section).
Study Overview
In the following we present three category-learning studies in parallel, in which we
investigated whether reward magnitude a ects (a) instance memory strength or (b)
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similarity-based category generalization from an exemplar perspective, and/or (c) the
weight given to feature dimensions (feature attention) from both an exemplar and a
cue-abstraction perspective. We first summarize the design, hypotheses, and planned
tests across the three conducted studies, while highlighting additional exploratory
questions in the course of the analyses (e.g., on the interplay between reward magnitude
and how representative an instance is of its category [typical vs. atypical] in Study 3).
In the Results, we analyze the e ects of reward magnitude on categorization accuracy
for repeatedly trained category items. In the Modeling section, we turn to the question
of how reward magnitude a ects category generalization (including novel items), in
which we di erentiate potential strategies and parameter changes in a Bayesian latent
mixture modeling approach. Finally, a joint analysis of categorization decisions and
behavior in reward-judgment tasks addresses the question of how category
generalization might be linked to learning and generalizing the reward value of category
instances.
The tests for the hypotheses were preregistered on the Open Science Framework
(OSF; osf.io) for Study 1 (osf.io/rkpxd) and Study 2 (osf.io/c3zqx); we made some
slight modifications, which are highlighted in the analyses. We also provide Online
Supplemental Material on the OSF, including all data and analysis scripts (R code; R
Development Core Team, 2008). The preregistrations also concern tests for decision
times and more detailed tests on the transfer-phase behavior, which are beyond the
scope of this paper but are provided in the Online Supplemental Material, as well as a
study-wise presentation of the methodological details of each study.1
Design and Hypotheses
In all three studies, participants learned how to categorize fictitious objects into
two categories, before applying their category knowledge to novel items in a transfer
phase. We varied between participants whether the reward magnitude for making
1Please note, we do not report the studies in chronological order to improve readability as suggested
by an anonymous reviewer. We first carried out Study 3, for which there is no preregistration, and then
focused on replicating the main results in Studies 1 and 2, in this order. In Study 2, we also extended
the design to investigate the e ect of penalty magnitude, which was, however, for exploration and is not
reported, also due to the lack of a valid baseline (equal penalties). The corresponding data can be found
on the OSF.
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correct categorizations varied between specific training exemplars (high- and low-reward
exemplars), or whether a correct categorization yielded the same reward for all
exemplars.
We tested the following hypotheses: First, increasing reward magnitude increases
instance memory strength (i.e., exemplar-specific V in the GCM; see Nosofsky, 2011,
and the Modeling section), which can be interpreted as an increased retrieval rate for
high-reward exemplars, or as strategic ignorance of low-reward exemplars during
category inference. An increased memory strength for trained high-reward exemplars
predicts an increase in their categorization accuracy but a decline in accuracy for
low-reward exemplars, compared to baseline performance. This hypothesis also covers
the idea that high-reward category exemplars are perceived as “more prototypical” (see
also Medin & Smith, 1981).
Second, if categories are generalized from exemplars to other (novel) stimuli, then
reward magnitude could a ect exemplar-specific similarity gradients. This idea is based
on two assumptions: that similarity gradients can be stimulus specific (see also
Goldstone, Steyvers, & Larimer, 1996; Rodrigues & Murre, 2007), and that reward
magnitude influences generalizations of value (Kahnt et al., 2012). If similarity
gradients of high-reward items become broader, this would predict a decrease in
categorization accuracy for low-reward items, without increasing accuracy for
high-reward items, compared to baseline performance.
The third hypothesis concerns the distribution of attention over stimulus features
or dimensions during category inference. Dimension attention is usually assumed to
correspond to how well a dimension predicts category membership (see Pothos & Wills,
2011) as well as rewards (see Le Pelley et al., 2016). With variable stimulus rewards,
high-reward stimuli might draw more attention than low-reward stimuli, which could
lead people to attend more strongly to those stimulus features that predict the category
membership of high-reward stimuli.
In Studies 2 (preregistered) and 3 (exploratory) we additionally investigated
whether the influence of reward magnitude on categorization behavior is related to the
generalization of reward, that is, the expected reward for categorizing a stimulus
correctly (e.g., Kahnt et al., 2012; Wimmer et al., 2012). In particular because reward
learning can be described by narrower similarity gradients for high-reward items, while
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our similarity hypothesis assumes broader similarity gradients for high-reward items, we
wanted to investigate if reward judgments and categorizations can be described by the
same modeling account. Specifically, we assumed that the exemplar similarity gradients
estimated in the category-generalization task can be used to predict subsequent
judgments about the reward value of trained and novel stimuli.
General Method and Materials
The experiments were programmed using javaScript (jsPsych; de Leeuw, 2015).
Studies 1 and 2 were conducted online on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Study 3 was
conducted in the laboratory and presented on standard desktop computers in single-seat
cubicles. The study design and methods were approved by the ethics committee of the
University of Zurich.
Tasks, manipulations, and stimuli. In all studies, participants learned how to
feed two animal species (Tami vs. Humi) with a limited number of food items (10 in
Studies 1 and 3 and 12 in Study 2), varying on three dimensions, each with
quasicontinuous values. Each item belonged to only one category, and learning
proceeded in single-item trials with corrective feedback after every decision (see Figure
1, Tables 1 and 2). The items were repeatedly presented in random order within 10, 10,
and 12 training blocks, in Studies 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Each correct categorization
yielded an immediate monetary reward in “thalers,” which was collected and exchanged
for a bonus payment after completion. In the control conditions (C in Tables 1 and 2)
all items rendered equal rewards, serving as a baseline reference for item-specific
performance changes in the reward conditions (between-subjects comparisons). In the
reward condition, two (Studies 1 and 2) or four (Study 3) items rendered a 10 times
higher reward (high-reward items) than the other items (low-reward items). The
high-reward items were equally distributed across categories to preclude category
preferences (e.g., Maddox & Bohil, 2001). In Study 3, we included two reward
conditions to counterbalance to which item sets (1 vs. 2) the high rewards were
assigned (see Table 2).
In general, the training-item categories were determined by a CAM (logistic
response function), based on the (mean-centered and equal-weighted) sum of the
stimulus dimension values, followed by a median split. Similar task structures have
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been previously used to investigate category learning and are usually found to induce
exemplar-based rather than cue-abstraction processes (or rule-based strategies; e.g.,
Ashby, Maddox, & Bohil, 2002; Bröder et al., 2010; Donkin, Newell, Kalish, Dunn, &
Nosofsky, 2015; Ho mann et al., 2016; Juslin, Jones, et al., 2003). In addition, Daniel
and Pollmann (2010) used a similar task when comparing neural activation patterns of
feedback and reward processing. Our task, however, di ered from structurally similar
information-integration tasks (e.g., Ashby & Gott, 1988). For instance, we repeatedly
presented stimuli and used rather discrete (though quasicontinuous) features, because
one of our goals was to test di erences in item identification. The visual representations
of the feature values are illustrated in Figure 1. In Studies 1 and 3, the visual
feature-to-dimension assignments were fixed, but they were randomly balanced in Study
2 (between participants). Similarly, in Study 3, the six possible visual arrangements of
the dimensions (left, middle, right location) were randomly balanced between
participants. The response button positions (see Figure 1) were randomly balanced
across participants in each study, as well.
A transfer phase followed that included trained and novel items (see Appendix A,
Tables A1–3), randomly presented in 6, 8, and 10 repeated transfer blocks, in Studies 1,
2, and 3, respectively. The trials were identical to the training trials but without
feedback, and each ended automatically after the decision. Correct classifications of the
trained items resulted in the same (covert) reward as during training. Novel items
yielded 3 thalers in any case (undisclosed to the participants) because there was no
objective accuracy criterion to determine their category membership.
To reduce the length of the online studies (Studies 1 and 2) we included only four
of the trained items in the set of transfer stimuli. This always contained the
high-reward items (i.e., Set ‘High’ in Table 1), and one random low-reward training
item per category. Thus, trained high- versus low-reward items were balanced in
number. This also gives more weight to the novel items in the cognitive model analyses
in Studies 1 and 2 compared to Study 3, in which we presented all 10 training items in
the transfer phase again.
We applied additional constraints to the stimulus sets to increase the strength of
our hypothesis tests. First, as depicted in Tables 1 and 2, the number of high-reward
items was generally low (i.e., 2, 2, and 4, in Studies 1, 2, and 3, respectively). Thus, it
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Table 1
Training Stimuli and Manipulations in Studies 1 and 2
Food item Dimension Reward Set
1( ) 2 ( ) 3( ) C R
Study 1
Humi
1 4 3 1 3 30 High
2 2 2 4 3 3 Low
3 3 1 4 3 3 Low
4 4 1 3 3 3 Low
5 1 2 5 3 3 Low
Tami
6 5 1 4 3 30 High
7 3 5 4 3 3 Low
8 4 1 5 3 3 Low
9 2 5 3 3 3 Low
10 5 3 2 3 3 Low
Study 2
Humi
1 2 4 1 3 30 High
2 4 2 2 3 3 Low
3 5 1 2 3 3 Low
4 2 1 4 3 3 Low
5 2 2 4 3 3 Low
6 1 4 2 3 3 Low
Tami
7 4 1 5 3 30 High
8 5 4 2 3 3 Low
9 4 5 2 3 3 Low
10 2 5 4 3 3 Low
11 2 4 4 3 3 Low
12 4 2 4 3 3 Low
Note. The three dimensions were represented by the visual stimulus features (see Figure 1).
Final sample sizes after exclusions (see Data Cleansing) were N = 90 in the Study 1 control
(baseline) condition and N = 90 in the Study 1 reward condition, and N = 61 in the Study 2
control condition and N = 80 in the Study 2 reward condition. Set summarizes the stimulus
rewards as used for indexing in the Results and Modeling sections. C = control; R = reward.
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Figure 1 . Example stimuli for Studies 1 (A), 2 (B), and 3 (C), and a training-trial
illustration for Studies 1 and 2 (D). (A, B) High-reward items in Studies 1 and 2.
Variations in the shading of the berries and number of lines in the leaves and base
represent the values of the dimensions (i.e., 1, 2, and 3 in Table 1). (C) Each row
represents one food item. Shape counts represent dimension values. (D) Clicking on
“Next’’ uncovered an item. After choosing an animal to feed (Tami vs. Humi), the
feedback was provided by coloring the correct category in orange. In the case of an
incorrect decision, the chosen option turned blue. Feedback and reward were uncovered
together with a “Continue” button. In Studies 1 and 2 (online), the potential reward
was always uncovered with feedback to ensure reward encoding. In Study 3
(laboratory), the potential reward was depicted before each trial (1 s; without “Next”
button), and the received reward was provided with feedback.
should have been easy to memorize the high-reward stimuli (if desired) in Studies 1 and
2. Second, in Study 3, the atypical high reward set (AR-High) also contained two items
that were atypical in the given category structure (i.e., they were exceptions to the
cue-abstraction predictions). High reward was associated with the atypical items in the
atypical reward (AR) condition and with typical items in the typical reward (TR)
condition. We introduced these exceptions to provoke memorization strategies rather
than using simple rules (e.g., a single square on Dimension 1 means Humi, otherwise
Tami). Overall, however, all three dimensions were similarly predictive, as indicated by
nearly equal logistic regression weights.
Under the constraints described so far, we used simulations to calculate predictions
using the formal models described in the preregistrations and the Modeling section.
Our goal was to make sure that stimulus sets and reward manipulations led to strongly
diverging behavioral predictions for the memory-strength, similarity, and attention
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Table 2
Training Stimuli and Manipulations in Study 3
Food item Dimension Condition Set
1( ) 2( ) 3( ) C TR AR
Humi
1 1 2 3 3 30 3 TR-high
2 1 1 3 3 30 3 TR-high
3 1 4 2 3 3 30 AR-high
4a 4 4 1 3 3 30 AR-high
5 1 3 1 3 3 3 Neutral
Tami
6 4 4 2 3 30 3 TR-high
7 2 2 4 3 3 30 AR-high
8 3 3 3 3 3 3 Neutral
9 2 4 2 3 30 3 TR-high
10a 1 2 4 3 3 30 AR-high
Note. The three dimensions were represented by the visual stimulus features (see Figure
1). The reward values (thalers) were balanced. C = control (baseline); TR = typical
reward; AR = atypical reward. Final sample sizes after exclusions (see Data Cleansing)
were N = 32 participants in the control condition, N = 36 participants in the TR condi-
tion, and N = 38 in the AR condition. Set summarizes the stimulus rewards as referred
to in the Results and Modeling sections in which the sets were indexed (e.g., TR-high
refers to items that rendered a high reward in the TR condition but a low reward in the
AR condition).
a Atypical category items.
hypotheses, which we describe in more detail in Appendix A. Intuitively, this led to
selecting training items with specific characteristics. That is, in Study 2, the two
high-reward items (Figure 1B) had unique category-predicting dimension values (i.e., 1
and 5 on Dimension 3), which was also partially the case for Study 1 (i.e., the Humi
high-reward item had unique values on Dimensions 2 and 3, and the value 5 on
Dimension 1 uniquely predicted Tami for the high-reward item). Thus, it should be
easy to maximize accuracy and reward for these two items. Furthermore, all
high-reward items had at least one dimension with extreme values. If the similarity
gradient for these items becomes broader (similarity hypothesis) this would predict
categorization errors for other items due to increased similarity (and interference) of
these extreme-valued high-reward exemplars.
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Feature attention. We measured potential changes in weighting (or attending
to) the dimensions in two ways. First, to test for changes in the absolute degree of
feature importance/attention, we asked participants to estimate the relative importance
of each dimension at the end of each study. They adjusted three horizontal slider bars
representing the dimensions until a percentage value, which was depicted next to each
slider, reflected their assessment of “relative importance” (also framed as “attention
paid to each dimension”) during the categorization transfer phase. The roughly
4-inch-wide slider bars moved in steps of 1 between 1 and 100 (constrained to sum to
100), and the dimensions were indexed by symbols as in Tables 1 and 2. We introduce
the second way of testing cognitive changes in feature attention using a modeling
approach in the Modeling section.
The stimulus characteristics described above also predict specific changes in
dimension attention/importance if high-reward items receive more attention. In general,
higher dimension values on average predicted Tami (see Tables 1 and 2). However, in all
studies, this relation would become negative (i.e., lower dimension values predict Tami)
for one dimension if attention was focused on high-reward items (e.g., Dimension 2 in
Studies 1 and 2). Also, Dimension 1 in the TR condition of Study 3 would not reliably
di erentiate between the categories of high-reward items and thus should be considered
as less important.
Reward judgments. Directly after the transfer phases of Studies 2 and 3,
participants performed a reward-judgment task in the reward conditions. In Study 2,
they estimated the likelihood that previously trained as well as 25 completely novel
items rendered a high reward on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 9
(very likely). The items were presented individually and in random order (see Table A4,
Appendix A). The novel items were selected so that they di ered in how similar they
were to previously trained high-reward items. In Study 3 we individually presented all
transfer items and asked participants to indicate whether they believed the item would
render a high reward (yes vs. no) and how confident they were in their decision on a
7-point scale ranging from 1 (not sure at all) to 7 (absolutely sure).
In Study 3, all participants also completed an item-recognition task (deciding
whether an item was seen in training or only presented in the transfer). This test was
conducted after the reward judgments in the reward conditions. This made it di cult
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to compare them to the baseline condition, in which no rewards were judged. Moreover,
the results did not a ect our conclusions and are therefore not reported (the data are
provided in the Online Supplemental Material).
Participants and Procedure
For Studies 1 (online), 2 (online), and 3 (laboratory), respectively, we recruited
204, 172, and 111 participants. The studies lasted about 25, 25, and 50 min. The online
studies were conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Study 1: U.S. citizens, age
M = 34.97 years, SD = 10.32, 93 females; Study 2: U.S. citizens, age M = 39.88 years,
SD = 11.53, 90 females). The laboratory study was conducted at the University of
Zurich and participants were recruited via the online database ORSEE (Greiner, 2015)
and notice boards (Swiss citizens, age M = 24.96 years, SD = 6.35, 89%
undergraduates, 72 females).2
In Study 1, participants received a lump-sum payment of $2.00 and a bonus of
$2.66 on average (range $1.66 to $3.83) depending on the accumulated thalers. The
exchange rates were 175 thalers and 380 thalers to $1.00, in the baseline and the reward
condition, yielding nearly equal overall payo s in the two conditions. In Study 2,
participants received a lump sum of $2.50 instead of $2.00, because we increased the
number of training items (and trials). We also increased the contribution of the bonus,
which was $3.03 on average, ranging from $1.30 to $4.59, with exchange rates of 145
thalers and 350 thalers to $1.00, in the baseline and the reward condition. In Study 3,
participants received a lump sum corresponding to Swiss Franks (CHF) 16.00 per hour
(N = 69) or course credit (N = 42), and a bonus payment of CHF 5.40 on average,
ranging from CHF 1.85 to CHF 8.52. The exchange rates were 125 thalers and 400
thalers to CHF 1.00 in the baseline and the reward conditions.
In each study, all participants first provided informed consent and then completed
a demographic survey, the training phase, and the transfer phase. In Studies 2 and 3,
the reward-judgment task (reward conditions only) followed the categorization transfer
phase. The feature-attention weights were surveyed at the end, before providing overall
2Unfortunately, there is no standard, or easy, way to calculate statistical power for (logistic) mixed-
model tests (see Rights & Sterba, 2018), as this would require prior assumptions about random e ect
variances. Such variations are unknown, and approximate solutions have been published only for simpler
designs (see Westfall, Kenny, & Judd, 2014).
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performance feedback and a debriefing.
In all studies, we announced the exchange rates and the existence of a transfer
phase before the training started. Participants in Studies 1 and 2 also answered two
control questions, testing whether they understood the training feedback procedure and
that they could increase their payo  with correct decisions. After incorrect answers, we
presented a summary of the instructions and asked again, which was repeated until
both answers were correct. Instead of using “catch trials” to capture inattentive
participants (see Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010), we added an “honesty check” to
the debriefing, where participants could self-declare whether they should not be
considered for the data analysis, for example, because they had used memory tools. We
made it clear that their honesty would not a ect their payment.
Data Cleansing
As preregistered for the online studies, we excluded those participants who
self-declared that their data should not be used (i.e., 10 and 12 participants in Studies 1
and 2, respectively), as well as those who incorrectly responded (at least) twice to the
task comprehension questions (i.e., 2 and 5 participants in Studies 1 and 2,
respectively). In Study 2, data from one participant were lost due to a storing error. In
each study, we also excluded participants who seemed to guess at the end of the
training, to ensure active learning. Instead of using classic outlier detection (e.g.,
Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1994), as preregistered for Study 1, we based our inferential
exclusions on Bayesian contaminant classification (e.g., Zeigenfuse & Lee, 2010; as
preregistered for Study 2), justified and explained in Appendix B.
In Study 1, nine participants were classified as “guessing” in the baseline
condition. In Study 2, seven participants were classified as “guessing” in each condition.
In Study 3, four participants were classified as “guessing” in the baseline condition and
one in the AR condition. The final sample sizes are given in Tables 1 and 2. The
“guessing” exclusions were done for all subsequent analyses, which did not a ect the
overall (omnibus) test results but did partially a ect the significance test results from
the post hoc comparisons between the conditions of Studies 2 and 3. The significance
tests without these contaminant exclusions can be found in the Online Supplemental
Material (Categorization Accuracy).
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Analysis Plan
To test our behavioral hypotheses (on accuracy) we used logistic mixed models (for
an introduction, see Singmann & Kellen, in press; see also Bolker et al., 2009). Besides
systematic fixed e ects, mixed (or multilevel) models take the hierarchical clustering of
variance in the data and e ects into account (e.g., variations within groups and/or
individuals). Roughly speaking, with multiple stimulus responses for each participant
(fully crossed) one can separately estimate the variance between participants and
between stimuli, called by-participant and by-stimulus random intercepts, respectively.
Additionally, a within-participant fixed e ect (e.g., of item reward) can vary in strength
between participants, which is modeled as a by-participant random e ect (the
commonly used term random slopes is omitted to avoid confusion with the slope
parameter described below). Ignoring such variance structures has been shown to lead
to severe alpha-error inflation in significance testing (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012).3
We used Type 3 likelihood-ratio tests (in R afex::mixed; Singmann, Bolker,
Westfall, & Aust, 2015), which provide p values for nonzero di erences in explained
variance between the full model (i.e., with all possible e ects) and the restricted models
(i.e., without the tested fixed e ects). However, to quantify the evidence against the
null hypothesis that performance is equal for each item set between conditions, we
report the results of a Bayesian logistic regression (using the brms::brm package in R;
Bürkner, 2017), which is hierarchically constrained on participant, stimulus, and e ect
variability, as done for the mixed model. We report the range of “most likely” estimates
for the central parameters (i.e., 95% credible intervals, CIs; for an introduction to
hierarchical Bayesian models, see M. D. Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014; Rouder & Lu,
2005), for simplicity, instead of Bayes factors (BFs; e.g., the prior-to-posterior likelihood
ratio; Dickey, 1971; see also Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2010, pp.
167–170, and Lee & Vanpaemel, 2018), because priors are very di cult to scale in
logistic models with multiple interactions and complex variance terms (e.g., depending
3Please note, in contrast to the suggestion of Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily (2013) to define the
maximal random-e ects structures that are justified by the design, we decided to define only the random
structures that included the theoretically relevant variance terms (e.g., without including methodological
counterbalancing variables), because overparameterization has been shown to decrease the chance of
detecting existing e ects (see Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015; Matuschek, Kliegl, Vasishth,
Baayen, & Bates, 2017).
REWARD MAGNITUDE IN CATEGORY LEARNING 22
on variable and e ect scaling and design coding; see also Rouder, Morey, Speckman, &
Province, 2012; Rouder, Morey, Verhagen, Swagman, & Wagenmakers, 2017).
Results
Categorization Accuracy
First, we wanted to find out whether and how categorization accuracy changes
when introducing item rewards of variable magnitude, compared to an equal-reward
baseline. We therefore focused on contrasting item-specific performance (i.e., trained
item sets high vs. low in Studies 1 and 2, and TR-high vs. AR-high in Study 3, see
Tables 1 and 2]) in the training and transfer phases. The accuracy over the training
blocks (learning curves), as well as in the transfer phase, is illustrated in Figure 2,
contrasting performance between the conditions (baseline vs. reward condition[s]).
As can be seen in Figure 2, varying the reward magnitude between category
instances indeed seemed to a ect categorization accuracy. However, instead of
motivating better performance, providing a 10 times higher reward for some items
seemed only to decrease accuracy on low-reward items. We tested the overall e ect in
each study by entering the factors of the corresponding condition (reward[s] vs.
baseline), set (high/TR-high/AR-low vs. low/TR-low/AR-high), and training block
(continuous, centered/standardized), including all interactions as fixed e ects in the
regression. In Study 3, we left out the neutral set (see Table 2) to reduce the number of
tests and to focus on the manipulated (counterbalanced) items.
We assumed random intercepts for participants and stimuli, and by-participant
random e ects of set, training block, and their interaction. In Studies 2 and 3, we
reduced the model complexity by assuming uncorrelated random intercepts and random
e ects, due to singularities and for reasons of model identification, respectively. We
conducted a similar test in the transfer phase (trained items only), again using a logistic
mixed model with condition and set and their interaction as fixed e ects, with random
intercepts for participants, stimuli, and transfer blocks, as well as by-participant
random e ects for set.
The results of the corresponding model likelihood-ratio tests in the training and
transfer phases are presented in Table 3. We found significant overall interactions
between the factors set and condition in Studies 1 and 3 in both training and transfer
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Figure 2 . Categorization accuracy for (A) Study 1 (A1 = high reward; A2 = low
reward), (B) Study 2 (B1 = high reward; B2 = low reward), and C() Study 3 (C1 =
TR-high/AR-low; C2 = TR-low/AR-high), over blocks of training (x axes: 2 blocks
cluster to 1 bin) and in the transfer phase (test). Comparison on trained items between
the baseline (controls) and the reward conditions (high or low rewards; same color =
same condition; see Tables 1 and 2). Error bars are 95% credible intervals of the
participant means. Histograms reflect relative frequencies of individual scores, and bins
reflect possible values (i.e., 0 to 1 in steps of 1/[items · trials]). C = baseline (control);
TR = typical reward; AR = atypical reward.
phases, but not in Study 2. Please note, the overall learning success in Study 2 was
unexpectedly low, with an average final accuracy of M = .64, SE = .01. Unfortunately,
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Table 3
Categorization Accuracy. Mixed-Model Results for Training and Transfer Phases
E ect df ‰2 p
Study 1 Training phase
Condition 1 0.26 .610
Set 1 1.59 .207
Block 1 121.80 <.001
Condition:Set 1 7.34 .007
Condition:Block 1 1.61 .204
Set:Block 1 30.52 <.001
Condition:Set:Block 1 0.74 .388
Transfer phase
Condition 1 0.04 .843
Set 1 1.25 .26
Condition:Set 1 7.96 .005
Study 2 Training phase
Condition 1 0.10 .752
Set 1 3.10 .073
Block 1 105.84 <.001
Condition:Set 1 0.08 .776
Condition:Block 1 0.00 .979
Set:Block 1 18.66 <.001
Condition:Set:Block 1 2.87 .090
Transfer phase
Condition 1 1.05 .306
Set 1 2.15 .143
Condition:Set 1 0.24 .62
Study 3 Training phase
Condition 2 3.41 .182
Set 1 3.00 .083
Block 1 131.00 <.001
Condition:Set 2 8.28 .016
Condition:Block 1 11.23 .004
Set:Block 2 0.99 .319
Condition:Set:Block 2 3.21 .201
Transfer phase
Condition 2 7.33 .026
Set 1 3.33 .068
Condition:Set 2 6.98 .030
Note. Type 3 likelihood-ratio tests (full vs. restricted models). Estimates highlighted in bold
significantly contribute to explained variance (.05 level).
this level of performance implies a loss of statistical power for detecting decreases in
accuracy.
To better illustrate the source of the significant interactions, we derived the
learning curve characteristics from the training data, which are usually referred to as
threshold and slope in item response theory (see Baker, 2001; see also Dixon, 2008).
The threshold ✓ defines the point on the continuous variable (i.e., training block t) at
which the logistic function predicts 50% accuracy. The slope   defines the curvature of
the sigmoid function over the values of the continuous variable (from slow change to
S-shaped/quick change), such that the probability of being accurate in a given training
block t is generally defined by p(Correct|t) =
1
1 + e≠ (✓+t)
2≠1
. The slope  , hence, is an
estimate of how quickly accuracy improves over learning. The theoretically meaningful
REWARD MAGNITUDE IN CATEGORY LEARNING 25
Figure 3 . Predicted average accuracy (y axes) over blocks of training (x axes), based on
hierarchical Bayesian regressions for (A) Study 1 (A1 = high reward; A2 = low reward),
(B) Study 2 (B1 = high reward; B2 = low reward), and (C) Study 3 (C1 =
TR-high/AR-low; C2 = TR-low/AR-high). The slope parameter estimates the rate of
growth (log scale) toward p(Correct) = 1, as illustrated by the icons. Histograms depict
posterior likelihoods of the means. Markers indicate average estimates. Item sets are
compared between conditions (controls vs. high or low reward; same colors = same
condition; see also Figure 2).
comparison between conditions is that of the slope  .4
4 In the Bayesian regressions (or mixed models), the parameters are factorized as p(Correct|t) =!
1 + e≠ ✓≠ t
"≠1. In regressions,  ✓ is usually referred to as the intercept, and  t is the training block
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The memory-strength hypothesis and the attention hypothesis predict that
accuracy improves for high-reward items while declining for low-reward items, and the
similarity hypothesis predicts that accuracy declines only for low-reward items,
compared to baseline. Figure 3 depicts the corresponding Bayesian estimates for the
average learning curves, as well as the posterior distributions for the slope parameters
( ). As we mean-centered the training block variable (SD = 1), the size of the slope
e ects can be conveniently interpreted relative to standard conventions (0 < very low <
0.35 < low < 0.7 < moderate < 1.4 < high; Baker, 2001).
We calculated the posterior di erences of the slopes between the conditions on
each item set from the Bayesian regression (Table 4). As can be seen, the CIs (i.e., the
95% most likely estimates) of the slope di erences on low-reward items always excluded
zero, even in Study 2. This was not the case for high-reward items. Please note, in
Studies 1 and 2, the training parameter estimates were less certain for high-reward
items than for low-reward items, due to fewer stimuli. However, the trends for
high-reward items also pointed in di erent directions between the studies, speaking
against the hypothesis of improved memory.
Finally, we also tested whether the training e ects translated to the transfer phase,
in which the trained items were presented together with novel items (without feedback).
For the transfer phase, we implemented a logistic hierarchical Bayesian regression,
defined as before, with condition and item sets as fixed e ects. Again, we calculated the
posterior di erences in item-specific accuracy estimates (log scale) between conditions
(Table 4, Transfer accuracy). As can be seen, the pattern of results changed. The
learning rate e ect translated to the di erences in transfer phase accuracy only in
Study 1 and in the AR condition of Study 3, while the CIs of all other di erence
estimates included zero.
In sum, the evidence generally supported the hypothesis that introducing variable
stimulus rewards in category learning decreases learning accuracy for low-reward items,
without leading to a benefit for high-reward items. In the transfer phase, the evidence
for this specific trend seemed less strong, as it occurred in only two of the four transfer
multiplied by its log-linear e ect. Importantly, the significant interactions between condition r and set
s (i.e., systematic variations of  rs✓rs), thus, shift ✓ to the point at which p(Correct|t) = .5 depending
on the size of the slope (which also makes it basically impossible to define priors, e.g., for the intercept).
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Table 4
Posterior Model Estimates for E ects of Reward Magnitude on Learning Rate (Training
Phase) and Overall Accuracy (Transfer Phase)
Contrast Di  95% CI Fig.
Training slopes
Study 1 High 0.083 [-0.129, 0.293] 3.A1
Study 2 High -0.096 [-0.310, 0.117] 3.B1
Study 3 High (TR) 0.097 [-0.183, 0.379] 3.C1
Study 3 High (AR) 0.224 [-0.026, 0.472] 3.C2
Study 1 Low 0.179 [0.063, 0.297] 3.A2
Study 2 Low 0.090 [0.003, 0.177] 3.B2
Study 3 Low (TR) 0.303 [0.052, 0.554] 3.C2
Study 3 Low (AR) 0.302 [0.043, 0.561] 3.C1
Transfer accuracy
Study 1 High -0.331 [-0.950, 0.286] 2.A1
Study 2 High -0.450 [-1.207, 0.314] 2.B1
Study 3 High (TR) 0.101 [-0.698, 0.922] 2.C1
Study 3 High (AR) 0.106 [-0.634, 0.835] 2.C2
Study 1 Low 0.578 [0.107, 1.065] 2.A2
Study 2 Low -0.140 [-0.677, 0.393] 2.B2
Study 3 Low (AR) 1.324 [0.577, 2.063] 2.C1
Study 3 Low (TR) 0.224 [-0.474, 0.939] 2.C2
Note. Bayesian model estimates for the di erences in the learning slopes and the transfer
accuracy (intercepts on log scale) between conditions on each item set (e.g., high reward vs.
baseline) with 95% credible intervals (CIs). Positive values always indicate higher parameter
values (e.g., steeper training gain in accuracy) in the baseline condition. Fig. references the
panels in Figures 2 and 3. AR = atypical reward; TR = typical reward.
phases, which is readdressed in the Discussion and Modeling sections.
Feature Attention
Next, we examined whether the distribution of attention to the stimulus
dimensions di ered between the baseline and the reward conditions. Feature attention
was measured via sliders, which were rescaled to p values between 0 and 1 for each
dimension (summing to 1) for the analyses. The stimulus layout used in Studies 1 and 2
was identical, but in Study 2 we counterbalanced the assignment of the dimension values
(with dimensions numbered as in Table 1) to the visual features to control for feature
salience (see Online Supplemental Material, Feature Attention for descriptive details).
To test for systematic changes in the dimension ratings (coded as in Tables 1 and
2) we conducted Dirichlet regressions (R, DirchletReg; Maier, 2014), estimating the
mean and precision parameters of the three-dimensional probability distribution, with
condition as a predictor in each study. A significant e ect of condition would reflect an
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overall change in the three dimension weights induced by our reward manipulations
(i.e., the model with separate Dirichlet distributions by condition explains significantly
more variance than a model with only one distribution). In Study 3, we also entered an
indicator for the six feature-counterbalancing conditions (main e ect and interaction
with condition; see Online Supplemental Material for further details).
In short, there were no significant e ects of our manipulations on the distribution
of reported dimension weights/feature attention. However, we replicated an attention
bias of about 45% on average given to the most salient berry dimension in both Studies
1 and 2 (also found when inferring dimension attention via cognitive modeling, see
Modeling section), suggesting that the measure captured meaningful variance. In fact,
the reported attention values di ered between the reward and baseline conditions by
less than 5% in all comparisons. Thus, variable rewards in category learning did not
seem to systematically a ect feature importance in the categorization transfer task. To
cross-validate these results we also analyzed the attention estimates derived from the
model analyses in the Modeling section. However, these results led to the same
conclusions and therefore are detailed only in the Feature Attention section in the
Online Supplemental Material.
Discussion
In general, reward magnitude did, indeed, a ect item-specific categorization
accuracy. We found evidence in all studies and conditions that low-reward items were
learned more slowly compared to the same items in an equal-reward baseline condition.
In contrast, in none of the studies did we find evidence that providing 10 times higher
reward for some of the training items was beneficial for learning these items, compared
to the baseline, even if it would have been easy to exploit their unique characteristics
(Study 2) to maximize accuracy and payo . There was no evidence that introducing
variable stimulus rewards a ected the attention paid to each dimension.
We further found that the e ects of reward magnitude on learning did not always
persist into the corresponding transfer phases, which suggests that encountering novel
items may reduce the e ect of reward and possibly changes the categorization process.
It is especially noteworthy that a carryover occurred only in one of the two reward
conditions in Study 3. Although the learning rate was equally a ected in both reward
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conditions, it carried over (very strongly) to the transfer phase of the AR condition, but
not of the TR condition. As the labels imply, in the AR condition high reward was
paired with atypical category items (or exceptions), while in the TR condition high
reward was paired with typical category items.
In Study 2, one major shortcoming was the unexpectedly low overall performance,
with about 60–65% final training accuracy. This might be due to the dimension values
more strongly overlapping between the categories, compared to Studies 1 and 3, leading
to more confusion. Nonetheless, although performance was generally low, we still found
evidence for slower learning (slope) of low-reward items, which was relatively weak
compared to Studies 1 and 3, but confidently larger than zero. As pointed out, even
within this rather di cult task, participants did not or could not exploit the fact that
the high-reward items had unique feature values, which could have considerably
increased their payo .
In sum, the behavioral analyses provide some striking evidence that variable
stimulus rewards might be detrimental when learning about stimulus categories. One
caveat when interpreting this e ect is, however, that the hypotheses depend on the
assumption that all participants rely on the same categorization processes (e.g.,
exemplar-based inference or cue abstraction). As this assumption is often doubted (e.g.,
Ashby et al., 2002; Bröder et al., 2010; Donkin et al., 2015; Ho mann et al., 2016), we
obtained further evidence regarding the relation between reward magnitude and the
di erent potential categorization processes, by carrying out more fine-grained analyses
using computational modeling.
Modeling
We initially introduced the hypotheses that reward magnitude could a ect the
availability of exemplars in memory (memory-strength hypothesis), the similarity
gradients of high-reward exemplars (similarity hypothesis), or the distribution of
attention to stimulus dimensions (attention hypothesis). The behavioral trends, so far,
challenge the memory-strength and attention hypotheses, as they predicted an increase
in accuracy for high-reward items compared to baseline. The predicted
between-participant di erences follow from expected behavioral changes within
participants. The observed within-participant changes (i.e., the di erence in
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performance for high- and low-reward items), however, is a qualitative prediction that
all three hypotheses would make.
One possibility to di erentiate the hypotheses on a within-person level is to use
cognitive modeling. Cognitive models formalize the assumptions of psychological
theories, such as similarity-based or rule-based category inference. Based on estimates
of free (unknown) cognitive parameters, such as feature attention or exemplar similarity
gradients, each cognitive model makes point predictions for behavioral data, which
makes it possible to test them against each other via likelihood measures. The
between-condition e ect we found (a detriment for low-reward items, without a benefit
for high-reward items) was predicted by the similarity hypothesis, which was derived
from the idea that the similarity gradients of high-reward exemplars might become
broader. Hence, when analyzing the transfer phase using cognitive models that
represent the three hypotheses one would expect that a GCM (Nosofsky, 1986, 2011)
with exemplar-specific similarity gradients is more likely than a GCM version with
exemplar-specific memory strengths, representing the memory-strength hypothesis
(please note that attention varies freely in both models). Furthermore, there should be
systematic di erences in exemplar similarity gradients on high-reward items between
reward conditions and the baseline condition. Additionally, the mixed behavioral
transfer results might be explained by a mixture of strategies. If the similarity
hypothesis best describes the behavior of one population of participants, the remaining
population might not show changes in cognitive processing. For instance, for the
cue-abstraction model the estimated dimension weights (feature attention) should be
equal between the conditions, to be consistent with the reported behavioral data on
accuracy.
In the following subsection we explain how we disentangle potential e ects on
exemplar memory strength and similarity gradients in the GCM (Medin & Scha er,
1978; Nosofsky, 1986), which has been successfully used to describe how people
categorize and how they judge item familiarity and typicality (Hahn & Chater, 1997;
Jäkel et al., 2008a; Jäkel, Schölkopf, & Wichmann, 2008b; Lamberts, 1995; G. Murphy,
2004; Nosofsky, 1988a, 1988b, 1992; Nosofsky, Clark, & Shin, 1989; Nosofsky & Palmeri,
1997; Pothos, 2007; Pothos & Bailey, 2000; Pothos & Wills, 2011; Sigala, Gabbiani, &
Logothetis, 2002; von Helversen, Herzog, & Rieskamp, 2014).
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The Generalized Context Model
The GCM (using Nosofsky’s, 2011, parameter notation) is formally based on the
assumption that decision makers retrieve instance representations from memory (stored
exemplars j, e.g., tru e and morel vs. yellow knight and death cap) to evaluate their
similarity sij to the current stimulus i. In its basic form (Nosofsky, 1986) the model
derives the category probability (e.g., edible or poisonous) for a given stimulus p(Q|i) as
the overall similarity to exemplars of that category relative to the similarities to all
available exemplars in q categories.
p(Q|i) =
q
jœQ sijq
q(
q
jœq sij)
(1)
The similarities sij are obtained, first, by calculating the di erence between the
stimulus i and each exemplar j as the sum of psychological distances between the
feature values xim and xjm across the feature dimensions m (e.g., color and shape).
dij =
ÿ
m
(wm|xim ≠ xjm|r)1/r (2)
The parameter r defines the metric for the dimension distances (e.g., city block with
r = 1), which are then weighted by the attention wm to the feature dimensions. An
attention weight shrinks or expands the distances between a stimulus and the exemplars
on each dimension. On the one hand, a higher value of wm increases the sensitivity to
small di erences on that dimension m, and categorizations should become more
accurate for (e.g., high-reward) exemplars that discriminate on this dimension. On the
other hand, if an attention weight increases on one dimension it automatically decreases
for other dimensions, because the weights are defined to sum to 1. Di erences on
dimensions with zero weights are neglected, which makes categorizations less accurate
for (e.g., low-reward) exemplars that are dissimilar on those dimensions.
After summing the weighted dimension distances, the subjective similarity sij is
then obtained via exponentiation:
sij = e≠cdij+ln(Vj) (3)
The psychological distance is weighted by the similarity gradient c and added to ln(Vj),
which describes an exemplar’s memory strength.5 First, with narrow similarity
5Please note, this formula is equivalent to the original (i.e., Vje≠cdij = e≠cdij+ln(Vj)) but more clearly
reveals the formal nature of memory strength as a similarity intercept/bias on the log scale.
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gradients (i.e., large values of c), exemplars become less similar to distant stimuli more
quickly than with broad similarity gradients (i.e., low values of c). In the decision
process, thus, narrow gradients represent (precise) integration of those exemplars close
to the stimulus (and strong stimulus-category discrimination), and broad gradients
represent integration of more distant exemplars (and more probabilistic predictions).
The self-similarity of an exemplar is always 1, meaning that c describes an indirect
influence of exemplars on stimuli. The c parameter, therefore, is often interpreted as an
individual’s sensitivity to (dis)similarity, but sometimes also in terms of confusion,
because broader gradients predict more categorization (identification) errors than
precise gradients (for details, see Jäkel et al., 2008b; Miendlarzewska et al., 2016;
Nosofsky, 2011).
Second, however, the multiplicative influence of the weighted exemplar distance
can be overruled by the memory strength of an exemplar, which can be viewed as a
retrieval rate. That is, large values of Vj not only increase the contribution of an
exemplar to Equation 1 but also indirectly reduce the contribution of other exemplars,
independent of their similarity to the stimulus. For instance, as initially described, if
two high-reward exemplars have higher memory strengths than all other exemplars, this
“erases” the low-reward exemplars from Equation 1, turning the GCM into a
reward-prototype model (following a “first recalled, first served” principle).
Finally, the similarity gradient can be allowed to vary between high- and
low-reward exemplars (cj). If the gradient becomes broader (i.e., c decreases) for
high-reward exemplars in the reward conditions, this would lead to a stronger
integration across a wider range of stimulus space. This increases their weight in the
decision process without becoming more available. This means low-reward exemplars
become more similar to the high-reward exemplars relative to themselves, which
introduces interference and, hence, decision errors. This interference might have an even
stronger e ect on accuracy if the high-reward exemplars are atypical for their category,
as in Study 3 (AR).
Crucially, the within-participant tendency to categorize high-reward exemplars
more accurately than low-reward exemplars can be predicted by changes in exemplar
memory strength but also by changes in their similarity gradients, or in
dimension-specific attention. However, the similarity hypothesis predicts that this stems
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from a decrease in accuracy for low-reward exemplars, instead of an increase in
accuracy for high-reward exemplars. This means each mechanism potentially explains
the individual data, but their descriptive adequacy further depends on more complex
predictions regarding category generalization for novel items, which we pin down using
Bayesian cognitive modeling.
Hierarchical Bayesian Modeling of Categorizations
To test which mechanism describes the influence of reward magnitude in
exemplar-based categorization decisions, we applied two separate versions of the GCM
(i.e., a memory and a similarity version; Nosofsky, 2011) to all decisions from the
transfer phase in each study and condition, describing the influence of reward
magnitude either by variations on item-specific memory or by the similarity gradient,
respectively.6 Figure 4 shows the graphical model of the similarity version of the GCM,
with prior definitions for Study 3. We tested the two GCMs against each other in a
hierarchical Bayesian latent mixture framework (see M. D. Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014;
p. 212, for an introduction).
To distinguish the exemplar account (the GCM) from cue abstraction (CAM) we
included a standard (mean-centered/unbiased) logistic regression (see also Juslin, Jones,
et al., 2003). Additionally, we implemented a recognition and bias model designed to
capture a family of unsystematic response strategies. Specifically, this model freely
estimates accuracy for trained items (varying between recognition and guessing), as well
as a choice bias for the novel items. A full description of all models and priors can be
found in Appendix C; here, we focus on the crucial aspects.
One of the four latent models was assigned to each participant, using a hierarchical
transdimensional Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method (see Sisson, 2005). In
this method, a categorical indicator selected the most likely model for a participant (k)
in each iteration. This indicator zk was hierarchically drawn from a Dirichlet
distribution (⇣zq), reflecting the mixture model likelihoods in each condition q (see
Bartlema, Lee, Wetzels, & Vanpaemel, 2014; M. D. Lee & Vanpaemel, 2008; for similar
6Please note, a GCM that includes free parameters for memory and similarity for the same exemplars is
very di cult to identify since they can cancel each other out (see Equation 3). Or as Jäkel et al. (2008a)
put it in a related discussion: “The exemplar weights defeat the purpose of introducing a similarity
measure for the stimuli” (p. 266).
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Figure 4 . Graphical Bayesian model of the generalized context model (GCM) with
separate similarity gradients µcqr for each set r of exemplars (indexed according to set in
Tables 1 and 2). Prior definitions are given for Study 3. The shaded box highlights the
tested di erence  cr of the estimated similarity gradients µcqr on each set r between the
reward condition and the corresponding baseline. Circles and squares represent
continuous and nominal variables, respectively. The model is embedded in a model
selection, and a common cause mechanism predicts both reported feature weights wk
and the total number of Tami responses yik (gray symbols) for each item i in the
transfer phase; see text).
applications and related discussions). The frequency (across sampling) with which a
model is selected for a participant was used as a measure for the confidence in the
individual assignment. To address potential issues raised by some researchers (e.g.,
Sisson, 2005)—namely, that unlikely priors can a ect the model and parameter
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likelihoods and thereby bias model selection—we implemented pseudo (data-driven)
priors. These priors were based on fits of the single models only, each with uninformed
priors (except for reasonable parameter constraints). Using di erent priors in the model
selection, however, led to very similar results.
Simultaneously, we tested the parameter di erences between the conditions for the
memory strengths (Vj) and the similarity gradients (cj) of the j exemplars. For this, we
hierarchically estimated the corresponding model hyperparameters (i.e., population
means and standard deviations) for the manipulated item sets r (indexed according to
Tables 1 and 2) in each condition (q). Specifically, in the memory GCM, we estimated
µVqr for the item sets that di ered on reward between conditions (i.e., set r = [high] in
Studies 1 and 2, and sets r = [TR-high/AR-low] and r = [TR-low/AR-high] in Study
3). We fixed the memory parameter to ln(Vj) = 0 (see Equation 3) for items that
yielded the same (low) reward in all conditions (i.e., set r = [low] in Studies 1 and 2,
and set r = [neutral] in Study 3).7
In the similarity GCM (Figure 4; without fixed values), we hierarchically sampled
the exemplar gradients ckj from the estimated population distribution with mean µcqr
and standard deviation  cqr (see Appendix C for details). As outlined, we would expect
the di erences between the similarity estimates in the q = baseline condition to indicate
narrower generalization than those in the q = reward condition(s) for r = high-reward
exemplars (reflected by  cr > 0 in Figure 4), but to remain unchanged for r =
low-reward exemplars.
However, because exemplar-specific parameters substantially increase the flexibility
of the GCM in all cases, we also included a common-cause constraint, to improve model
convergence and theoretical plausibility. In particular, each of the cognitive models
implements feature attention/weighting parameters (e.g., !k in Figure 4), which are
essential for making predictions. Thus, the models’ performance evaluations were based
on both the categorizations and the subjective feature-attention measures (wk in Figure
4). For the CAM, in which the dimension weights were not constrained to being positive
and sum to 1 (as in the GCM), we normalized the estimated absolute weights for fitting
7By definition of the GCM, a model that fixes memory strength for high-reward items and estimates
memory strength for low-reward items is formally identical to the reported model. A model with free
memory strengths for high- and low-reward items is unidentifiable (see Appendix C).
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the reported weights. Please note, negative weights in the CAM (ceteris paribus) reverse
the polarity of the corresponding dimension but leave the common interpretation
unchanged (i.e., indicating the sensitivity to each dimension in predicting choice). For
the recognition and bias model, we assumed random equal weights, for convenience.
Modeling Results and Discussion
The model ran on six chains with 100,000 iterations in all studies and with sampler
adaptation periods of 20,000 iterations (R package JAGS; Plummer, 2015). However,
there were severe issues with the memory GCM: Specifically, the chains for µVqr did not
converge. All attempts to solve this issue failed (e.g., reparameterization, more
samples). Furthermore, across all studies, only 10 participants were confidently assigned
to this model (zk frequency>90%), without showing evidence for the hypothesized e ect
on memory strength. A GCM memory model alone (single model fit) fully converged
but also did not show evidence for the hypothesized memory e ect. These analyses
suggest that the memory GCM captured rather singular (and unreliable) behavioral
patterns during the model selection procedure, but not the observed e ects of our
reward manipulations, which is consistent with the conclusions from the results on
categorization accuracy.
Because of these convergence issues and to be able to reliably estimate the
evidence for the similarity hypothesis, we conducted a second analysis excluding the
memory GCM. In this analysis, all models fully converged (same settings as before).
The individual model assignments in Table 5 show that the GCM was the dominant
model in Study 3, but on par with the CAM in Studies 1 and 2 (see Appendix Table D1
for all parameter estimates, and Appendix Figure D1 for average categorization
behavior in each group). To evaluate the mapping between the predictions and the
data, we derived the posterior predictions (see M. D. Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014) of the
GCM and CAM. That is, for both model populations we simulated category predictions
for each transfer item, taking all uncertainty of the estimated hyperparameters into
account. These posterior predictive checks (see Figures 2 and 3 in the Online Appendix
on OSF) clearly indicate systematically di erent predictions between the models, with
an imperfect but overall satisfactory match between the actual behavior of the
participants and the model predictions.
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Table 5
Number of Participants Best Fit by Each Model
Condition Rec/Bias GCM CAM
Study 1
Baseline 11 (9) 43 (39) 36 (32)
Reward 17 (15) 41 (38) 32 (30)
Study 2
Baseline 13 (12) 22 (17) 26 (20)
Reward 15 (12) 31 (27) 34 (20)
Study 3
Baseline 13 (12) 16 (15) 3 (3)
Typical reward 10 (10) 21 (19) 5 (4)
Atypical reward 16 (12) 18 (15) 4 (3)
Note. Numbers in parentheses reflect participants assigned with at least 90% confidence (i.e.,
a model was more likely than all other models in more than 90% of the Markov chain Monte
Carlo samples). Rec/Bias = Recognition and bias model; GCM = generalized context model;
CAM = cue-abstraction model.
Additionally, about 35% of the participants were classified as being in the
recognition and bias group in Study 3, but only 16% and 20% of the participants in
Studies 1 and 2, respectively. Please note that an assignment to this model group can
mean that a participant’s behavior is either poorly described by the GCM or CAM, or
well described by assuming guessing or a choice bias (or both). In fact, this group
showed systematic behavior (e.g., good recognition of trained instances) in Study 3, but
not in Study 1 or 2 (see Figure 1 in the Online Appendix on OSF). However, given that
the cognitive processes underlying these responses are unclear, we focus here on the
GCM and CAM groups.
To test the hypothesis that a higher reward alters exemplar similarity gradients
(i.e.,  cr ”= 0) we first derived the distribution for the null hypothesis by calculating the
di erences between two half-Cauchy priors as defined for µcqr (see also Figure 4). To
approximate the likelihood at zero di erence we took the posterior density in the [-0.1,
0.1] interval for the null distribution, as well as for the corresponding parameter
posteriors for each item set. Please note, due to the MCMC model selection procedure,
the participant group assignments determine which participants contribute (and how
much) to the estimation of these posteriors (i.e., the GCM posteriors only update for
participants k for which zk = 2, see Figure 4).
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Table 6
Reward-Induced Di erences in Exemplar-Specific Similarity
Similarity di erence
Contrast  cr 95% CI BF
Low reward (Set)
Study 1 1.01 [-0.37, 2.42] 1.35
Study 2 0.11 [-2.07, 2.36] 0.62
Study 3: TR (neutral) -0.03 [-3.63, 3.47] 0.96
Study 3: AR (neutral) -1.61 [-5.38, 1.87] 1.33
Study 3: AR 1.12 [-1.79, 4.04] 1.13
Study 3: TR -1.29 [-4.13, 1.59] 1.14
High reward (Set)
Study 1 2.08 [0.34, 3.87] 9.58
Study 2 3.41 [0.06, 8.11] 6.98
Study 3: TR 0.63 [-2.09, 3.4] 0.87
Study 3: AR 4.96 [2.15, 7.93] >100
Note. Posterior means for exemplar-similarity di erences ( cr in Figure 4) between the baseline
and each reward condition (see sets in Tables 1 and 2) in the generalized context model group.
Positive values reflect broader similarity gradients in the reward condition compared to the
baseline. In Study 3, The neutral set rendered 3 thalers in all conditions, and the high-reward
set in the atypical reward (AR) condition (which was the low-reward set in the typical reward
[TR] condition) included two atypical items. CI = Credible interval; BF = Bayes factor.
We then calculated the BFs (SD density ratios; Dickey, 1971), which are presented
together with the 95% CIs in Table 6. As can be seen, except for the TR condition in
Study 3, the similarity gradients for high-reward exemplars were confidently smaller
than the corresponding baseline estimates (CIs > 0, and BFs > 6.9). But there was no
evidence of di erences in the measures for low-reward items (all BFs ≥ 1) in all studies
and conditions.
In sum, the model analyses, indeed, supported the hypothesis that the similarity
gradients of high-reward instances become broader, compared to baseline, if
participants rely on exemplar-based category inference. This seemed to be the case even
in Study 2, in which we found no e ect of reward magnitude on accuracy in the transfer
phase. In contrast, in the TR condition of Study 3, in which we also did not find
evidence for an e ect of reward magnitude on accuracy in the transfer phase, the GCM
analysis did not suggest broader similarity gradients for high-reward items.
While the mixed pattern of results in Study 2 seems related to a combination of a
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generally weak performance and a latent mixture of cognitive processes (GCM and
CAM) in the transfer phase, the pattern in Study 3 still remains unclear and might also
depend on whether participants actually learned (or generalized) the reward values of
the stimuli. Thus, we conducted a final analysis of the participants’ reward judgments,
to test how well they recognized the reward values of the trained category instances,
and to investigate the relationship between reward generalization to novel items and
category generalization.
Predicting Reward Judgments From Categorizations
In Studies 2 and 3, participants completed reward-judgment tasks in the reward
conditions after the category-transfer phase. They had to predict whether correctly
classifying a presented item would result in a high or a low reward. If similar (or
interacting) cognitive processes underlie exemplar-based category inference and
reward-value inference, we would assume that both can be described by exemplar
similarity gradients. Accordingly, the GCM parameters that best describe the
categorization decisions should also allow predicting the participants’ reward judgments,
at least as long as they have learned which training items have high and low rewards.
To test this assumption, we first derived predictions for the reward judgments
based on exemplar similarity using the GCM; that is, we calculated the probability
(which we then treated as a judgment) that a presented item will be classified as high
reward by providing the model with the exemplars’ outcome labels (high vs. low
reward) instead of their response labels (Tami vs. Humi). Importantly, to make a priori
predictions for the reward judgments, we used the GCM parameter posteriors that were
estimated in the category-transfer phase (see Appendix Table D1), instead of fitting the
judgment data.
More precisely, in each iteration of the model selection for the category-transfer
decisions, we simultaneously presented each item of the reward-judgment task to the
GCM. The prediction of the probability of a high reward was based on a parameter
sample from the hyperposteriors. The averages of the resulting distributions of
item-judgment predictions, thus, reflect the expected average item-reward judgments of
the GCM population. We compared the predicted average judgments to the actual item
judgments, aggregated within each group of most confidently classified participants (i.e.,
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Figure 5 . Reward-value generalization. The item-specific predictions of the GCM (x
axes) are plotted against the corresponding reward judgments (y axes) for Studies 2 (A)
and 3 (B). For Study 2, A:CAM and A:GCM refer to the subgroups of participants
inferred in the reward condition (see Table 5). For Study 3, B:GCMTR and B:GCMAR
refer to the participants in the two reward conditions (see Table 2). Color coding
corresponds to Figures 2 and 3. Markers depict single items. Unknown refers to
untrained transfer (Study 3) or novel (Study 2) items. Shaded areas are standard
regression confidence intervals (95%). Bayes factors (BFs) reflect evidence for r ”= 0 (see
text). TR = Typical reward; AR = atypical reward.
with confidence > .9 in Table 5). To avoid making assumptions about the mapping
between the judgment and the prediction scales, we focused on correlational evidence
instead of other fit measures.8
The relation between the item judgments and the GCM predictions are depicted in
Figure 5. The correlations were obtained using Bayesian estimation (R package
8Although conceptually equivalent, this approach deviates from the preregistered analysis, for which
we planned to extend the Bayesian framework (transfer phase) to jointly estimate the GCM parameters
for the categorizations and the reward judgments. The presented approach was chosen for simplicity,
and to ease the interpretation of the GCM judgment predictions of the di erent groups.
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BayesFactor::correlationBF; Morey & Rouder, 2018; medium prior scale = 1/3,
undirected). As can be seen, in Study 2 there was very strong evidence of a correlation
between the GCM predictions and the reward judgments of the GCM group (Figure
5A:GCM, CIr [0.50, 0.83]), while there was only weak evidence of correlations when
participants were assigned to CAM (Figure 5A:CAM, CIr [-0.01, 0.54]). The general
pattern within the recognition and bias group (not shown) was nearly identical to that
in the CAM group, with r = .3, BF = 2.7, CIr [0.0, 0.56]).
Thus, in Study 2, similarity-based reward generalization was evident for those
participants who also seemed to rely on instance similarity in category inference. Please
note, most low-reward items (black circles in Figure 5A:GCM) were judged as being
likely low-reward items in this group, suggesting that both high- and low-reward items
were accurately recognized. Crucially, about 48% of the variance in the average reward
judgments was predicted by the GCM with the parameter values estimated in the
categorization task. In contrast, the scatter plots for the CAM group in Study 2 (Figure
5A:CAM) show that while participants in this group still tended to correctly respond to
high-reward items (triangles), the judgments for novel items (white circles) and trained
low-reward items (black circles) are rather randomly distributed around 50%.
Finally, in Study 3 there was no evidence of a linear relation between the average
item judgments and the GCM predictions in condition TR (Figure 5B:GCMTR, CIr
[-0.32, 0.38]), but strong evidence in condition AR (Figure 5B:GCMAR, CIr [0.17, 0.73]).
This pattern mirrors the observed e ects for categorization accuracy, and the model
analyses in the transfer phases, suggesting the possibility that the absent e ect of
reward magnitude in the transfer phase of the TR condition is related to the absence of
reward-value generalization in the GCM group. Together with Study 2, the overall
pattern leaves little doubt that reward generalization influences category generalization,
if instance similarity drives both types of inferences, whereas categorization processes
based on cue-abstraction processes do not seem to be a ected.
General Discussion
Reward magnitude has been argued to be the driving force guiding preferential
decision making (Kahnt, 2018; Schultz, 2006; Sutton & Barto, 1998). Additionally,
stimuli associated with higher reward values automatically attract more attention than
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those associated with lower reward values in various cognitive tasks, such as working
memory and perceptual decision tasks (e.g., Allen & Ueno, 2018; B. A. Anderson, 2013;
Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009; Klink et al., 2017; Lebreton, Jorge, Michel, Thirion, &
Pessiglione, 2009; Miendlarzewska et al., 2016). These perspectives suggest that
variable rewards for correct decisions might also influence cognitive processes in
inferential decision tasks and, thus, objective decision accuracy. We investigated this
question in a category-learning paradigm. We compared three hypotheses for how
variable rewards might a ect categorizations by a ecting (a) memory for high-reward
exemplars, (b) their psychological stimulus similarity, or (c) the distribution of
attention to stimulus dimensions (see Le Pelley et al., 2016; Miendlarzewska et al.,
2016; Seger & Peterson, 2013).
In three studies we tested the related behavioral hypotheses, whether introducing
variations in stimulus-specific reward magnitude for correct decisions increases
categorization accuracy for high-reward items and decreases accuracy for low-reward
items. For this, we compared item-specific scores for categorization accuracy in the
category-learning and transfer phases of conditions with variable stimulus rewards (high
vs. low) to conditions in which all stimuli were associated with the same reward.
Overall, against the common intuition that providing a higher reward motivates (or
enhances) learning, none of the three studies provided evidence that high-reward items
were learned systematically better than in the baseline condition with equal rewards,
even if high-reward items had unique identifying features. In contrast, we found that
learning speed and accuracy were reliably impeded for low-reward items (i.e., during
learning) in all studies and conditions. Furthermore, in two of the three studies, this
reduction in categorization accuracy persisted in a subsequent category-transfer phase.
Although general performance di erences between high- and low-reward items
(i.e., within participants) are compatible with the memory-strength, similarity, and
attention hypotheses, only the similarity hypothesis predicts that these di erences
reflect a detriment for low-reward items (i.e., compared to the baseline condition). In
contrast, the memory-strength and attention hypotheses predicted a concurrent increase
in accuracy for high-reward items. The similarity hypothesis received further support in
a computational modeling approach using hierarchical Bayesian model selection. We
tested the three cognitive assumptions, as implemented in an exemplar (GCM;
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Nosofsky, 2011) and a cue-abstraction account (CAM, using the weighted sum of
feature values; e.g., Juslin, Jones, et al., 2003) on their ability to predict the
categorizations of the participants in the transfer phase.
Specifically, for those participants best described by the GCM, we found moderate
to strong evidence that reward magnitude changed the similarity gradients of
high-reward exemplars (becoming broader), compared to baseline. We found this e ect
in all three studies, except for one condition (discussed below). However, the results
speak against the idea that a higher reward enhances exemplar memory strength or
that reward magnitude leads to a shift in attention to dimensions that predict category
membership of high-reward items.
To shed further light on the relationship between reward learning and category
generalization, we also asked the participants to complete a reward-judgment task. In
it, they estimated the likelihood that presented items would render a high versus low
reward. We found that these judgments correlated with the predictions of a GCM
model adapted to predict reward magnitude. Most crucially, the reward-judgment
predictions were obtained using the most likely GCM estimates from the
category-transfer phase. However, we found a correlation only for the group of
participants who were assigned to an exemplar-based strategy in the category-transfer
phase, and not for CAM participants.
In sum, the evidence from our studies supports the idea that reward magnitude
impedes category learning for low-reward instances without a benefit for high-reward
instances, most probably by a ecting processes of similarity-based inference. In the
following, we discuss the theoretical implications of these results, as well as boundary
conditions, limitations, and future directions.
Reward, Memory, and Similarity
At first glance, our finding that high-reward items are not categorized more
accurately, compared to baseline, seems to contradict previous research reporting that
reward enhances stimulus recall in working memory tasks (or memory strength). It is
important to note, however, that the idea of reward-boosted memory (e.g., Wallis et al.,
2015) usually refers to a di erence between high- and low-reward stimuli. Thus, it seems
worth considering a detriment for low-reward stimuli as a potential explanation, as well.
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The general pattern of our category-learning results, thus, is in line with previous
findings on the e ect of reward magnitude on cognitive processes such as memory and
attention (e.g., Allen & Ueno, 2018; B. A. Anderson, 2013; Della Libera & Chelazzi,
2009; Klink, Jentgens, & Lorteije, 2014; Klink et al., 2017). But instead of the
memory-strength hypothesis, they support the hypothesis that prioritizing high-reward
stimuli a ects their similarity gradients during exemplar-based decisions (i.e., broader
gradients of high-reward instances). However, the key aspect of this interpretation—an
absence of reward-enhanced learning—was partially based on inconclusive evidence for
the null hypothesis. Thus, this result requires further investigations that include a
broader set of category structures.
Nonetheless, a recent study similarly showed that presenting all stimuli more
often—usually assumed to increase memory strength (see also Nosofsky, 2011)—does
not increase the accuracy with which stimuli are classified, compared to a control
condition (Homa et al., 2018). The authors proposed that the influence of stimulus
frequency on categorization, as well, might be better described by varying similarity
gradients, rather than memory strength.
Indeed, memory strength seems to be a meaningful formal concept to capture
frequency e ects in tasks that explicitly ask for recalling or recognizing stimuli (e.g.,
Donkin et al., 2015; Nosofsky, 1991b). However, stimulus frequency also seems to a ect
categorizations di erently from what might be expected from a GCM perspective (e.g.,
Hendrickson et al., 2019; Homa et al., 2018). In line with Nosofsky’s (1991) argument
that empirical investigations need to substantiate theorized principles, these findings
raise the general question of whether categorization phenomena that seem intuitively
related to memory strength (e.g., reward and frequency) might rather point to changes
in stimulus-specific similarity gradients (see also Goldstone & Son, 2005; Hendrickson et
al., 2019). More critically, it has been argued that exemplar memory weights are prone
to model overfitting while annulling the meaning of similarity gradients in
exemplar-learning models (Jäkel et al., 2008a; p. 266).
Thus, assuming changes in similarity gradients might be a more general path to
explain e ects of reward magnitude or stimulus frequency. In fact, by changing their
“attraction” as a function of similarity (instance-specific similarity gradients),
exemplars can become “magnets” in stimulus space, a metaphor that has been used to
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describe the behavioral e ects of stimulus frequency in categorization (Nosofsky, 1991b;
p. 114). However, the similarity perspective still has a caveat. Although, the idea that
reward magnitude a ects similarity gradients seems to apply in both categorization
decisions and reward-learning tasks (Kahnt et al., 2012), the way it does so is
inconsistent. While the behavioral results of Kahnt et al. (2012) indicate narrower (or
more precise) gradients for high-reward items, we estimated broader (less precise)
gradients for high-reward items in the categorization task with two exclusive categories.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this apparent contradiction also seems to be
present under manipulations of stimulus frequency, as studied by Hendrickson et al.
(2019). Their data suggest that the e ect of increased stimulus frequency also depends
on whether two exclusive categories are learned, or only one category (A vs. not-A).
That is, the categorization behavior in these conditions seems compatible with broader
and narrower similarity gradients, respectively.
Last, we found that the reward judgments in Studies 2 and 3 could be predicted by
the GCM based on the most likely model parameters in the prior categorization task.
This suggests that similarity-based category generalization and similarity-based reward
generalization are closely related and are potentially equally a ected by reward
magnitude. This dovetails with the idea that similarity-based generalization in
categorization is a process tightly linked to or moderated by the similarity-based
generalization of stimulus reward value (Miendlarzewska et al., 2016; Seger & Peterson,
2013).
Insights from neuroscience corroborate this idea, showing that one common
mechanism a ects both similarity processes, defined by the pattern of dopaminergic
activity, which is induced by corrective feedback and rewards. Reward magnitude seems
to modulate this activity (see Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009; Everitt, Morris,
O’Brien, & Robbins, 1991; Galvan et al., 2005; Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer,
2001; Mahler & Berridge, 2009; Miendlarzewska et al., 2016), also in category learning
(see Daniel & Pollmann, 2010). Increased dopaminergic activity, in turn, might a ect
how stimulus features are associated with the categories, and the notion of inference
based on associative memory often goes hand in hand with the idea of similarity-based
inference (e.g., Kahnt et al., 2012; Miendlarzewska et al., 2016; Wimmer et al., 2012;
Wimmer & Shohamy, 2012; see also Seger & Peterson, 2013, p. 1190).
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Reward and Dimension Attention
Neither participants’ self-reports nor the computational modeling indicated that
participants changed which stimulus dimensions they attended to in response to
stimulus-specific rewards. This is somewhat surprising in light of research suggesting
that people direct their attention to stimulus features that best predict the desired
outcomes (e.g., Le Pelley et al., 2016; Sutton & Barto, 1998). One simple reason why
this assumption did not generalize to our category-learning task could be that obtaining
(high) rewards required participants to categorize the stimuli accurately. Nevertheless,
our attention hypothesis built on the general idea that attention shifts to feature
dimensions that di erentiate between the categories of high-reward items (predicting
enhanced performance for these items). Of course, such hypotheses depend on the
theoretical framework used to define the circumstances of observing a positive e ect of
reward magnitude.
Thus, the null e ect of variable rewards on dimension attention deserves further
empirical investigation (e.g., using di erent categorization tasks and reward structures),
including theoretical questions about the fundamental processes that drive attention
learning. One possibility that would allow integrating our results with common
reinforcement-learning theories would be that dimensional attention mainly depends on
which criterion/response is learned in a task, rather than its more or less desired
consequences (i.e., people learn to predict either category membership or reward, or
other labels). This would imply that stimulus-specific reward magnitude also might not
influence dimension attention when a reward is delivered regardless of categorization
accuracy, which seems an interesting avenue for further research.
Boundary Conditions, Rules, and Exceptions
Although our studies present a coherent pattern of results, they also indicate that
variable rewards did not always lead to systematic changes in cognitive processing,
compared to the baseline condition. First, when participants were best described by a
CAM, there was no evidence that their dimension weighting was a ected by reward
magnitude. It seems consistent that in Study 2, these participants also did not
generalize the reward magnitude of the training stimuli to novel ones and also failed to
recognize low-reward stimuli.
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Thus, in line with the above discussion, it seems that reward generalization and its
influence on category learning is limited to similarity-based decision processes, and it
should be noted that we used task structures that arguably increase reliance on
similarity-based processing, that is, so-called information integration category
structures, in all three studies (e.g., Ashby et al., 2002; Bröder et al., 2010; Donkin et
al., 2015; Ho mann et al., 2016; Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003). It seems worth
investigating whether and how such category and task characteristics (including
stimulus design) might influence the pattern of results, for instance, by more-or-less
“inducing” participants to use rule-based strategies. In this vein, notwithstanding the
descriptive capabilities of the GCM (Nosofsky, 1986), it seems inconsistent how the
model describes reward e ects via similarity gradients, because it requires the
assumption that the direction of the e ect depends on the task type (as in “one vs. two
categorization tasks”; see Hendrickson et al., 2019; Kahnt et al., 2012; see also Polk et
al., 2002, Schechtmann, Laufer, & Paz, 2010 ). From a more general perspective, this
raises the question of whether there is a more consistent way to describe these findings
(e.g., via learning models), which might also a ect their cognitive interpretations (e.g.,
similarity vs. memory strength) which we address in future research.
Second, in Study 2 the detrimental e ect of reward magnitude was seemingly
present during category learning but was obscured by overall low performance,
providing a natural constraint on observing this e ect. Moreover, if decision strategies
moderate the influence of reward magnitude on categorizations, reward e ects may
depend on a mixture of cognitive processes in the population. In line with this idea, we
did not observe an overall e ect of reward magnitude on accuracy in the
category-transfer phase in Study 2, but the model analyses revealed evidence that
reward a ected the similarity gradients of high-reward exemplars for the subgroup of
participants best described by the GCM.
Last, di erences between the typicality of high- and low-reward items could have
influenced whether the e ects of reward magnitude occurred. While we found the
strongest e ect of reward magnitude on similarity gradients in the AR condition of
Study 3, in which we paired high reward with atypical category exemplars, the e ect
was absent in the counterbalancing condition TR, in which we paired high reward with
typical exemplars. One potential explanation for the strong e ect in the AR condition
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could be that integrating atypical exemplars should lead to more errors because they
are not representative of their categories. Thus, increasing the similarity gradient of
atypical items might enhance this e ect even further.
The absence of an e ect in the TR condition, however, seems more puzzling and
could be related to the presence of atypical items in general or less e ective reward
learning, as it appeared that reward generalization was concurrently absent in the GCM
group of the TR condition. However, given the exploratory nature of Study 3, and the
ongoing debate regarding the special role of atypical items (or exceptions) in memory
and their implications for the representation of categories (e.g., Erickson & Kruschke,
1998; Nosofsky et al., 1994; Poldrack et al., 2001; Poldrack & Foerde, 2008; Savic &
Sloutsky, 2019; Schlegelmilch, Wills, & von Helversen, 2018), these explanations should
be considered speculative, and further research is needed to disentangle the e ects of
typicality and item rewards.
Limitations, Implications, and Future Directions
Finally, it is also important to consider the limitations and future directions of our
research approach. First, although the behavioral e ects during learning indicate that
reward a ects learning processes, our modeling analyses focused on the transfer phase
decisions. Thus, our analyses provide the insight that similarity-based processes may be
involved in the interaction between reward and category learning but do not rule out
alternative cognitive approaches. Consequently, our findings highlight the need to
investigate existing category-learning accounts, such as the configural cue model (e.g.,
Gluck & Bower, 1988), the attention learning covering map (ALCOVE) (Kruschke,
1992), the supervised and unsupervised stratified adaptive incremental network
(SUSTAIN) (Love et al., 2004), the rational model (Sanborn et al., 2010), the divergent
autoencoder (Kurtz, 2007), the S.O.S. network (Goldstone et al., 1996), the category
abstraction learning model (Schlegelmilch et al., 2018), and other accounts (see Pothos
& Wills, 2011) and their assumptions about how reward magnitude a ects learning and
generalization, and to test their ability to consistently explain empirical data in
di erent tasks.
The second limitation concerns our focus on positive reward values. The observed
e ects might not directly translate to negative values (punishment; but see Schechtman,
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Laufer, & Paz, 2010). For instance, Kahnt (2018, p. 328) discussed that values (or
magnitudes) are neurally coded on a common scale (see also Kahnt, Park, Haynes, &
Tobler, 2014), but that the valence of reinforcement (positive vs. negative) is distinctly
processed. Furthermore, dopaminergic activity might serve di erent functions, that is,
serving to motivate or inhibit depending on whether there is a reward or punishment
(e.g., Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, & Hikosaka, 2010; Schultz, 2006). In addition, an
important further question is whether the influence of reward magnitude on cognitive
processing is moderated by individual di erences in reward (or reinforcement)
sensitivity (e.g., Corr, 2004; Daniel & Pollmann, 2010).
Despite these limitations, the possibility that di erences in reward magnitude,
which are omnipresent in everyday life, might impede the cognitive processes of
category learning bears importance from two general perspectives. For one, category
learning shares several aspects with other cognitive domains, such as working memory
(Jonides et al., 2008; Lewandowsky, 2011; Oberauer et al., 2007), inferential choice, and
probabilistic decision making (e.g., Achtziger et al., 2015; Pachur & Olsson, 2012), and
any task that includes the memorization and identification of stimuli and their
multiattribute integration (for further discussions, see Goldstein, 1991; Juslin, Jones, et
al., 2003; Markman & Ross, 2003; Miendlarzewska et al., 2016; Russell et al., 1999;
Seger et al., 2015; Seger & Peterson, 2013; E. R. Smith & Zarate, 1992). A common
understanding of the influence of reward magnitude might help identify the converging
theoretical constructs and unify our understanding of their underlying cognitive
processes.
Second, it needs to be shown if reward magnitude similarly a ects learning and
generalization of stimulus categories in more natural categorization or judgment tasks
(see G. L. Murphy, 2016; J. D. Smith, 2005). This includes considerations of how
natural categories are structured, and how reward magnitude is distributed within and
between categories. For instance, in the stock market, rare instances might tend to be
more profitable, and also more similar to each other, while being riskier (e.g., belonging
to di erent behavioral response categories).
On a broader scale, a potential influence of reward magnitude on stimulus
similarity seems to concern any domain in which similarity is considered as a viable
theoretical model of information integration (see also Polk et al., 2002). This includes
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the domain of economic decision making but also therapeutic training, machine
learning, and neuroscience, which, as well, increasingly focus on the described
mechanisms of stimulus generalization and reinforcement to understand learning and
behavior (see Jäkel et al., 2008a, 2008b; Miendlarzewska et al., 2016; O’Doherty et al.,
2017; Swan, Carper, & Kendall, 2016; for related reviews, respectively).
Conclusion
Taken together, our results suggest that introducing instance-specific di erences in
reward magnitude impedes learning of category instances associated with low rewards,
compared to equal-reward control conditions, without being beneficial to high-reward
instances. We conducted hierarchical Bayesian model analyses on category-transfer
decisions after learning, using an exemplar model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1986, 2011; Medin
& Scha er, 1978) and a CAM (weighted additive; e.g., N. Anderson, 1981; Juslin, Jones,
et al., 2003), which included making predictions for an additional reward-value
generalization task. The combined results suggest that when participants rely on
exemplar memory or similarity-based processes during category inference, but not when
they rely on cue abstraction, learning and generalizing stimulus reward values can be
reliably predicted as well. Crucially, when relying on exemplar similarity to infer the
categories of novel stimuli, the similarity gradients of high-reward stimuli seem to
become broader, which also predicts increased confusion errors among low-reward
instances. Cognitive functions of cue abstraction (i.e., cue validity or feature attention)
seem una ected by stimulus-specific rewards.
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Context of Research
Our research is situated within a broader research program on exemplar memory
processes in judgment and decision making and was motivated by the open question of
how performance rewards can influence category representations and decision behavior.
We initially assumed that increasing the reward value for correctly classifying specific
stimuli would increase the quality with which they are memorized, but none of our
studies supported this idea. After the first study (Study 3), we focused on testing
(falsifying) this reward-enhancement e ect (Studies 1 and 2) under optimal conditions
for observing it. We simultaneously made sure we would be able to test an important
theoretical alternative that might be related to the replicated finding, that introducing
variable rewards in category learning rather impedes learning of low-reward items.
Consequently, the discussed theoretical implications will guide our future research
focusing on conceptual replications in various categorization tasks and on finding novel
category-learning accounts that can consistently integrate related phenomena.
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Appendix A
Stimulus Selection and Model Simulations
To find the optimal design, first, we randomly sampled training items according to
the predefined general category structures and constraints described in the main article
(Tasks, Manipulations, and Stimuli) and randomly assigned a high or low reward to
some of them (balanced between categories; e.g., one high-reward item in each category
of Study 1). In Studies 1 and 3, we used the sample items to map our hypotheses onto
parameter variations in the GCM (i.e., 4 times higher memory strength for high-reward
exemplars [representing a stronger integration of high-reward exemplars] vs. equal
memory strengths for all exemplars [representing the baseline]) and a CAM (i.e., a
regression with dimension weights based on the training stimuli but including four
additional copies of the high-reward stimuli [representing a stronger focus on
high-reward items] vs. equal weight regression [representing the baseline]). We also
included an unpublished GCM variant described in the preregistration for Study 1.
However, we dropped it from the analyses because it did not account well for the data.
We do not discuss it further as the theoretical grounds on which it was based are
beyond the scope of this paper.
On the basis of these model assumptions, we predicted the category probabilities
for all possible transfer items and selected an approximately equal number of items
from the predefined categories. More specifically, we selected potential transfer items
that strongly di ered on their predictions between all models. On the basis of the
predictions of these transfer items, we then simulated the responses of 100 participants
for each (data-generating) model, by sampling individual responses from a binomial
distribution. We further included variations in the number of transfer responses for each
item between the simulation runs in order to find the optimal (ecological) design. After
this, each model was fit via maximum likelihood on the simulated transfer choices for
each participant individually, free fit in Study 3, or by using a cross-validation
technique (i.e., leave-one-out) in Study 1.
We repeated these samplings and finally selected a design in each study that
provided at least 80%-correct model recovery based on model Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) values (e.g., such that the predictions of the baseline or
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memory GCM versions could not be well mimicked by a CAM with freely varying
feature weights). In Study 2, which we conducted last, we only considered the
theoretical results from Study 1 in a Bayesian prediction method, which focuses on the
similarity hypothesis. That is, we used the GCM parameter posteriors from Study 1 to
make transfer predictions (all items) based on potential training items for Study 2. We
then identified which items and manipulations were most sensitive to changes in
similarity gradients despite including a large degree of parameter uncertainty in the
simulation.
Table A1
Novel Transfer Stimuli in Study 1
Food item Dimension
1( ) 2 ( ) 3( )
1 2 3 1
2 1 4 1
3 2 4 1
4 3 4 1
5 2 1 3
6 1 1 4
7 2 1 4
8 3 1 4
9 1 3 4
10 2 2 3
11 1 4 3
12 4 1 1
13 4 3 2
14 1 1 2
15 3 4 2
Note. The dimensions correspond
to those described for the training
items (same order).
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Table A2
Novel Transfer Stimuli in Study 2
Food item Dimension
1( ) 2 ( ) 3( )
1 4 5 1
2 5 4 1
3 5 5 1
4 4 4 2
5 3 4 1
6 2 4 1
7 5 2 1
8 1 4 1
9 2 3 5
10 4 2 4
11 3 3 5
12 5 2 3
13 3 3 2
14 2 4 2
15 1 4 3
16 1 5 2
17 2 5 2
18 5 1 3
Note. The dimensions correspond
to those described for the training
items (same order).
Table A3
Novel Transfer Stimuli in Study 3
Food item Dimension
1( ) 2 ( ) 3( )
1 1 2 2
2 2 1 2
3 5 1 1
4 2 1 3
5 1 1 4
6 5 5 1
7 2 5 3
8 5 1 3
9 3 5 4
10 4 5 4
Note. The dimensions correspond
to those described for the training
items (same order).
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Table A4
Novel Reward-Judgment Items in
Study 3
Food item Dimension
1( ) 2 ( ) 3( )
1 1 5 4
2 1 2 4
3 3 5 3
4 4 4 3
5 5 5 3
6 5 4 4
7 5 2 3
8 5 5 4
9 1 3 4
10 1 5 3
11 1 2 3
12 1 1 2
13 1 5 5
14 5 3 3
15 1 1 3
16 1 3 3
17 3 5 5
18 1 2 5
19 4 5 5
20 3 3 3
21 3 2 1
22 1 3 5
23 1 2 1
24 1 1 1
25 3 1 1
Note. The dimensions correspond
to those described for the training
items (same order).
Appendix B
Participant Exclusions and Modeling Contaminant Classification
Because our hypotheses were focused on the question of how reward a ects
category learning, we wanted to ensure that participants, indeed, learned the
categorization task, especially in the online studies. Eventually, we decided to
implement a Bayesian contaminant classification as introduced by Zeigenfuse and Lee
(2011), assigning participants to guessing, medium-performance, and high-performance
groups within each study and condition. The group means were nonhierarchically
estimated with ⇡guess = .5 < ⇡medium < ⇡high, sampling ⇡medium, high ≥ Uniform(.5,1), and
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individuals (k) were assigned to each group via zk ≥ Categorical(⇣), sampled from a
Dirichlet distribution estimating the latent mixture of these groups, with a prior of
⇣ ≥ Dirichlet(1, 1, 1). The accuracy estimate for the selected group then served as the
latent probability of the number of correct responses for the participant in the last two
training blocks, assuming a binomial response distribution with the corresponding
number of observations. We excluded all participants who were assigned to the guessing
model in more than 90% of the samples (the models converged on three chains with
20,000 iterations).
Because the performance was very low in Study 2, only one participant was
confidently assigned to the guessing group, although a number of participants performed
below chance. Instead of using a lower confidence criterion (i.e., 80%, as preregistered
for Study 2), we decided to increase the number of observations and used the last three
training blocks. However, alternatively using the lower confidence criterion (as
preregistered) had the same e ect. We further considered other exclusion methods (e.g.,
extreme behavior, extremely low response times [as preregistered for Study 1], or a
simple 50%-accuracy criterion at the end of the training), which slightly di ered in their
consequences regarding the mixed-model pairwise (significance) tests in Study 3 (also
with respect to model convergence); these are reported in the Online Supplemental
Material (Categorization Accuracy). This was not the case for Studies 1 and 2. For
Study 3 this might seem crucial; however, as it was our first study, we used conservative
(undirected) significance criteria (despite having directed hypotheses) and strict p-value
adjustments, which a ected the results more heavily than the exclusions. That is, when
we used the same significance criteria as for Studies 1 and 2, the results of Study 3 were
identical to those reported in the main article, even without participant exclusions.
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Appendix C
Model Descriptions and Priors
Memory GCM. For the memory GCM, we sampled the values of µVqr from a
Cauchy distribution with a mean of zero, passed to a lognormal distribution on the
participant level to sample Vj (i.e., the distribution is normally distributed on the log
scale). This method follows a reformalization of the GCM similarity function, that is,
with Vje≠cd = e≠cd+ln(Vj). Thus, the memory-strength estimate can be conveniently
interpreted in terms of a similarity intercept/bias, such that, for example, a value of 0
in the distribution of µVq r e ectively becomes Vj = e0 = 1 when sampled on the
individual level (i.e., no di erent from low-reward items fixed to Vj = 1), and higher
and lower estimates are symmetrically scaled (e.g., twice the memory strength: 2 = e.69,
half the strength: .5 = e≠.69). We sampled one value for each participant in the memory
GCM and applied it to all items of a set.
Similarity GCM. We sampled the gradient hyperparameters, µcqr and  cqr from
truncated Cauchy and Gaussian distributions, respectively. The choice of the Gaussian
prior for the standard deviation did a ect the results (i.e., the precision constraint on
this prior), which should be viewed with some caution (see Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014,
p. 112). However, this choice was based on two important aspects. First, the prior is
informed by the formal definition (or flexibility) of the GCM’s generalization function.
In short, there is hardly a di erence in the predictions of a GCM with large values of
ckj (≥ 15) and one with extremely large values of the gradient (≥ 100). Thus, sampling
individual gradients from a population with a very tolerant (large) standard deviation
will not contribute to parameter convergence, because medium and large individual
values are virtually equally likely, although low similarity gradients are still covered.
This leads to less certain µcqr posteriors (wider CIs), as large standard deviations also
allow a variety of means.
Second, and partly as a consequence of the first point, attempts to model the
standard deviation (e.g., with more liberal sampling at the tails of the distributions
using uniform or Cauchy distributions) led to frequent samples at the ceiling of the
defined truncation range, as well as artificially skewed parameter posteriors. Thus, the
model tended to prefer large standard deviations. Optimally, one would use fewer
restrictions on the range of values to allow the parameter to converge at the most likely
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Figure C1 . Graphical Bayesian model descriptions. (A) Generalized context model
(GCM) with set-specific memory strengths. (B) GCM with set-specific generalization
gradients. Shaded boxes in A and B highlight the parameter tests of interest, that is,
di erences in memory strength  Vr and similarity  cr, on each item set (r), between
conditions (see also Figure C2).
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Figure C2 . Graphical Bayesian model descriptions. (A) Cue-abstraction model (CAM).
The stimulus values pim given to CAM were mean-centered on their corresponding
scale, reflecting an unbiased standard regression. (B) Recognition and bias model, and
(C) Latent mixture model selection, and common cause modeling (see text).
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values. However, as described, extreme values of the similarity gradient are di cult to
interpret. Thus, we forced the hyperposterior distribution of the gradient standard
deviation into a Gaussian shape, to increase the model’s commitment to more focused
estimates and, in turn, more specific population mean estimates. This seems in line
with arguments by Lee and Vanpaemel (2018), as well as Rouder, Morey, Verhagen,
Swagman, and Wagenmakers (2017; see Choice of Priors section). However, there are
other ways of sampling the similarity gradient that we did not explore (e.g., a Gamma
distribution; see Bartlema et al., 2014).
We sampled individual ckj for each exemplar in set r from the hyperdistribution.
That is, ckj does not distinguish between the distribution of participants and of
exemplars in an item set. More complex solutions to disentangle item and participant
distributions seem statistically unreasonable in our design (e.g., implementing
by-participant sampling distributions for item sets with two exemplars). Simpler models
(e.g., sampling ckj as done for Vkr) did not converge in all studies. Thus, we applied the
converging solution to each study, which also seems theoretically consistent if one opens
oneself to the idea that similarity gradients are not equal for all exemplars. However,
please note, this solution makes the model more flexible than in its usual
implementation.
Recognition and bias model. The parameter  estimates how accurate the
transfer phase decisions are for trained items (as deviation from perfect recognition),
regardless of the category. The parameter   estimates a choice bias for novel transfer
items. The model, thus, covers a range of behavior, from overall guessing to recognition
to “unidentified strategies” for novel items. Because the latter may vary widely between
participants, we expanded this term with the parameter ✏ (i.e., one value for the whole
population), introducing random noise into the estimates, which also eliminated issues
with auto-correlations on  .
Choice of priors. Single model fits were used to define pseudopriors
(data-driven priors) for two main reasons. First, Rouder et al. (2017, p. 309f)
recommended fine-tuning precision priors to test for parameter di erences via BFs,
especially with unscaled (unstandardized) parameters. That is, if the prior precision is
set too high or too low, it will include either too many unreasonable or too few
reasonable parameter values, respectively. Fine-tuning the priors, thus, prevents a too
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high or too low prior mass for zero parameter di erences (e.g., for the null hypothesis
 cr = µcr[Baseline] ≠ µcr[Reward Condition] = 0), which a ects the conclusions based on the
obtained BFs in parameter comparison. Second, with respect to latent class model
selection, as performed in our studies, it has been discussed that transdimensional
model selection methods can falsely favor unlikely models by sampling unlikely
parameters for likely models (see Sisson, 2005), which can become more severe in large
model and parameter spaces. Using pseudo (data-driven) priors is one possible solution
to this potential issue. However, in our studies, using di erent (or less-informed) priors
basically led to the same results.
For obtaining the pseudopriors, we used single model fits with relatively
uninformative priors in a plausible range of parameter values (see Table C1). As
described, the purpose of this method was tuning the priors with respect to the model
selection and the parameter tests. To avoid biasing our hypothesis tests with the
data-driven priors, the single-model GCM did not contain exemplar-specific parameters,
that is, assuming one similarity gradient per participant, while setting the memory
strength to 1 for all items (we also left out the common cause constraint on feature
attention). As described, an advantage of obtaining the pseudopriors from the
“null-e ect” version of the GCM is a reasonable assumption about the prior scale
(precision) having “one common” similarity-gradient parameter in the current task.
However we used a more liberal prior scale for µcrq (i.e., precision set to 1) than the
actual single-model estimates to avoid an inflation of the resulting BFs. That is, to
obtain prior likelihoods for the null hypothesis (i.e., for  cr = 0 and  Vr = 0), we took two
of the defined priors of the corresponding hyper means (e.g., µcq) and simply subtracted
them from each other. If their precision had been larger (e.g., 5), this would have
substantially increased the reported BF in favor of the alternative, as this prior scale
would reflect a very sceptical belief about the existence of an e ect, and, thus, a
stronger change toward a new (less sceptical) belief. To obtain the BFs, finally, we also
calculated the parameter di erences between the conditions (e.g., µcr[baseline] ≠ µcr[AR] in
Study 3) and compared them to the prior via the SD density ratio (Dickey, 1971) in the
interval of [-.01,.01]. We used the same prior scales for the similarity gradient and the
memory strength for all studies and conditions, for convenience and consistency in
interpreting the BFs.
